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 i 
Abstract 
 
In 2015, 78% of Detroit’s city council was African American – the highest 
percentage in the country. For decades, there had been an assumption in the academic and 
activist fields that a legislative body with such a high percentage of minority presence 
would produce incredible policy gains for that group (i.e. African American Detroiters). 
Instead, the council passed no Black racial policy. In a city where there were ostensibly 
no barriers for passing racial policy -- there were no subsequent policy gains. Though 
running contrary to existing scholarship, Detroit is not an anomaly; it is an indicator of 
the larger trend. 
Using a mixed methods approach, I consider the impact of descriptive 
representation (i.e. presence of a minority group) on representation in policy (i.e. policy 
outcomes). The thesis that emerges from my examination is that the relationship between 
descriptive representation and representation in policy is not static, as has been suggested, 
but dynamic. The amount of representation in policy that a group achieves is a function 
of descriptive representation, but the relationship is not linear. More descriptive 
representation does not always predict more representation in policy. And indeed, cities 
with the most descriptive representation often have relatively low levels of representation 
in policy. This work challenges the current body of literature and calls for substantial 
revision of seminal theory.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Representation is the foundation of modern democracy. As citizens of a 
democratic state, we agree to abdicate our right to vote on every piece of legislation, in 
favor of a less frequent vote for a representative. We believe that a representative will 
convey our policy preferences within the political arena. We believe that representatives 
are important, serving as both a conduit of our preferences and a reflection of our ideals.  
 With such an important role in democratic society, it is not surprising that 
representation has been studied with commitment and vigor. Starting perhaps with 
Hobbes’ Leviathan, modern political scholars have spent considerable time, energy, and 
text exploring the mechanisms at work in representation. From the purely philosophical 
exploration (i.e. this is how representation should work, e.g. Pitkin (1967), Brown (2006), 
Tate (2001)), to the wholly practical (e.g. Epstein and O’Halloran’s  quantitative study 
aligning roll call votes and constituent surveys (1999b)) –much of the representation 
question has been answered. However, a gap remains in the field’s understanding. My 
mission in this dissertation is to add clarity to an unanswered question in representation: 
how does presence affect policy outcomes? Representation is too important a topic, too 
foundational an issue, to leave parts of it in the shadows of murky understanding. My 
goal is to bring another corner of representation into the light.  
Consider this example of a previously unanswered question: in 2015, 78% of 
Detroit’s city council was Black – the highest percentage in the country. For decades, 
there had been an assumption in the academic and activist fields that a legislative body 
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with such a high percentage of minority presence would produce incredible policy gains 
for that group (i.e. Black Detroiters). Instead, no Black racial policy was passed. In a city 
where there were ostensibly no barriers for passing racial policy -- there were no 
subsequent policy gains. Though running contrary to existing scholarship, Detroit is not 
an anomaly; it is an indicator of the larger trend. 
 In the first iterations of this project, I devised a small-scale project that tested the 
existing representation theory in cities. My preliminary findings were not explained by 
the literature. As in Detroit, I found evidence of relatively high levels of representation in 
policy in cities with all white councils, and relatively low levels of representation in 
policy in cities with very diverse councils. The gains in presence were not mirrored in 
policy outcomes. Consider the data below, from the cities with the highest levels of Black 
and Asian descriptive representation in the country.  
 
 
Table 1.1 Black Representation - highest descriptive representation in the country 
City Descriptive Representation Representation in Policy* 
Detroit 78% 0% 
Atlanta 69% .08% 
Birmingham 78% .12% 
 
* The average Black representation in policy in 2015 is .29% 
 
 
 
Table 1.2 Asian Representation - highest descriptive representation in the country 
City Descriptive Representation 
Representation in 
Policy** 
Honolulu 89% .5% 
Fremont, CA 50% 0% 
San Francisco 45% .12% 
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**Average Asian representation in policy is .209% 
Previous literature has suggested that after a minority group achieves a certain 
level of presence on a legislative body, its policy shortfalls will be solved. Suddenly, 
minority groups will have the political power and capital to pursue a policy agenda that is 
geared almost exclusively towards their racial group. If that is not the case, as my work 
suggests, then there is considerable room for new theory, models and data to substantiate 
a new perspectives about representation.  
 This introductory chapter is organized as follows. I first discuss the 
conceptualization of key terms. Next, I present the problem statement – a summary of my 
perspective on what is missing from the literature and how my work rectifies this. Third, 
I present the conceptual framework that undergirds my study; this is a brief summary of 
the most pertinent theory and literature from the field. Fourth, I discuss my research 
questions and logic models. Fifth, I present my basic theoretical argument. Sixth, I 
review my methods, describing both the quantitative and qualitative approaches to 
answer the research questions. Finally, I lay out the limitations of my research, as well as 
an outline for the remainder of the dissertation.  
Conceptualization of Key Terms 
 
It is essential to establish a set of shared definitions and conceptualizations. In this 
section, I define the main concepts in the project. There are two main variables in the 
project: descriptive representation (the main independent variable) and representation in 
policy (the dependent variable).  
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Descriptive representation is conceptualized in two ways – specific and general. 
Specific is belonging to a particular racial group (e.g. African American members of a 
council). General is belonging to any racial minority (e.g. minority members of council). 
Throughout this project, I refer both to the concept as a whole and, when appropriate, the 
bifurcated conceptualization into specific and general. 
Throughout this dissertation, I use the phrases “representation in policy” or 
“policy outcomes” to describe the dependent variable in my models. Those familiar with 
the field may ask why I am not using the phrase “substantive representation”, as it is 
common in the literature. I argue that the literature has mutated the original conception of 
substantive representation, bending and twisting the idea into something that is easy to 
measure but theoretically unrecognizable from Pitkin’s original work. See Chapter 2 for a 
full discussion. 
Representation in policy is also conceptualized in two ways: a) racial policy and 
b) diversity and equity policy. Racial policy is explicit about its racial nature, naming the 
racial group that it aims to affect. This idea emanates from David Canon’s work Race, 
Redistricting, and Representation (1999). Canon writes, “Bills dealing with civil rights, 
discrimination, minority businesses, and historically black colleges; the racial justice act; 
the anti-redlining in insurance disclosure act; and dozens of pieces of commemorative 
legislation… are coded as racial” (D. Canon, 1999, p. 166). I use the same tactic, as have 
others (e.g. Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999b; Weir, 2007). 
Diversity and equity policy promotes diversity, equity and inclusion goals 
explicitly. To conceptualize diversity policy, I developed a definition parallel to that of 
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Canon’s racial policy. I defined diversity policy as policies that explicitly state their 
equity and diversity goals. This definition is supported by the field (e.g. Fassinger, 2008; 
M. N. Htun, 2003; Nishishiba, 2003; Tolbert & Hero, 2001). 
 
Problem Statement  
 
 
I argue that the research setting of previous studies has had an incalculably large 
effect on the results and conclusions of the field. Despite the large body of research about 
descriptive representation and policy outcomes; there is no consensus. Stalwarts of the 
field are posed at opposing sides of the argument. Some say that descriptive 
representation leads to more representation in policy (e.g. Childs, 2001; Dahlerup, 1988; 
Mansbridge, 1999; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012; Tate, 2001; Whitby & Krause, 2001). 
Others argue that there is no link between the two variables, and that the evidence 
supporting a positive link between descriptive representation and policy outcomes is 
tenuous at best (e.g. Beckwith & Cowell-Meyers, 2007; Z. L. Hajnal, 2001; Hero & 
Tolbert, 1995; Lublin, 1997; Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2014). The reason for this 
disconnect is that the research setting has biased the results. The scholars are looking at 
only pieces of the picture, and missing the true nature of the relationship.  
The majority of scholarship considers only state and regional legislatures – where 
descriptive representation is always low (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2 below) (Manning, 2016; 
Ornstein, 2014). 
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Figure 1.1 US Senate Racial Composition, 1990 - 2015 
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Figure 1.2 US House of Representatives Racial Composition, 1990 - 2015 
 
 By choosing this frame of study, scholars have limited themselves; they have fallen into 
the fallacy of a restricted range of data. They are only seeing part of the real effect of 
descriptive representation, and thus, all sweeping claims about it should be considered 
suspect. My work here is part of that requisite further inquiry.  
I test the impact of descriptive representation on policy outcomes. By looking at 
the local level, I circumvent the restricted range fallacy, including cases of very high and 
very low descriptive representation. The thesis that emerges from my examination is that 
the relationships are not static, as has been suggested, but dynamic. The amount of 
representation in policy that a group achieves is a function of the level of descriptive 
representation achieved, but it is not a linear relationship. More descriptive representation 
does not always predict more representation in policy. And indeed, cities with the most 
descriptive representation often have relatively low levels of representation in policy.  
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Conceptual Framework for the Study 
 
 The conceptual framework of a study is the scaffolding that readers climb, 
making their way upwards to the author’s final new argument. It provides the intellectual 
shortcuts for the reader, ensuring a shared foundation of knowledge upon which to place 
a new argument. My conceptual framework begins with Pitkin, moves to Kanter’s, 
Dahlerup’s and Mansbridge’s critical mass theories, finally touching on Kanthak and 
Krause’s tokenism theory. Though discussed in detail in Chapter 2, this section serves as 
grounding for the reader, ensuring common reference points. 
A conversation about political representation must start with Hana Pitkin. She 
changed the field’s understanding of representation in the modern context. Furthermore, 
she engendered one of the paramount concepts in my dissertation: descriptive 
representation. In her seminal book, The Concept of Representation (1967), Pitkin 
introduces four ways to discuss political representation, two of which are relevant to my 
study. Substantive representation is a key idea in this work but, as I discuss in detail 
below, it impossible to operationalize the concept; I therefore use ‘representation in 
policy’ in its place. Descriptive representation is the main independent variable across my 
models.  
According to Pitkin, descriptive representation occurs when constituents share 
their primary identifying characteristic with their representative. The brilliance of Pitkin’s 
definition of descriptive representation is that it both captures the important idea in its 
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entirety1, and simultaneously is simple to measure. This has led to a robust body of 
literature about the causes and effects of varying levels of descriptive representation.  
Roseabeth Moss Kanter’s (1977) contribution to political representation 
conversations is somewhat unexpected. Unlike the other giants in the field that make up 
my conceptual framework, Kanter does not come from a political science background, 
but from a public and business administration lens. Her perspective on critical mass in the 
corporate world takes on the form of a typology about group dynamics – some with more 
and some with less representation of minority groups. Despite coming from a different 
research setting, one can, as I do, draw a straight line from Pitkin to Kanter to the 
researchers of today.  
Drude Dahlerup was the next in line to make groundbreaking discoveries in terms 
of critical mass. Focusing on political representation, Dahlerup (1988) streamlines 
Kanter’s four-part typology into two: large and small minority groups. In her 1999 
article, Jane Mansbridge took the work previously done engendered the modern 
application of critical mass. Previous scholarship, looking for a link between descriptive 
representation and policy outcomes, had been flummoxed. There was an ostensibly 
logical connection: more women in the legislature (as was the focus of the study at the 
time) should lead to more policies for women. However, there was paltry evidence to 
support this claim. Counterintuitive quantitative results had stymied the field, until 
Mansbridge’s addition: Critical mass. Simply, she writes that there have to be enough 
                                                
1 A relatively recent addition to the field is intersectionality in primary identities. For example, scholars 
have looked at Black representatives and women representatives, but far less attention was paid to Black 
women representatives. Though there is considerably more research on intersectional identities now, 
squaring that literature with that of Pitkin’s descriptive representation has not yet happened in a convincing 
way. It is certainly an area of scholarship that should, and will, receive more attention in the years to come.  
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women, or as she later extends it enough people of color, to see a measurable increase in 
representation in policy. When there are very few women in the legislature, their ability 
to coalesce and advocate for policy is limited. She finds that more women in the 
legislature leads to more policy favored by women -- but only after there are enough 
women as to affect policy outcomes.  
Considering Pitkin, Dahlerup and Mansbridge together, the scaffolding for my 
dissertation starts to come together. I am exploring the interplay of representation and 
policy, with the wrinkle that different levels of descriptive representation have different 
effects on policy outcomes. Essentially, this is an extension of Dahlerup’s and 
Mansbridge’s logic. If pre-critical mass descriptive representation has a different effect 
on policy outcomes than post-critical mass – why stop there? Why not study the 
difference between no descriptive representation and tokenism? Why not explore the 
difference between critical mass and majority descriptive representation? Using the 
conceptual framework developed by these giants, and paired with the work on tokenism 
by Kanthak and Krause (2012), and my own theoretical work on no descriptive 
representation and majority descriptive representation, I start to develop a more 
complete understanding of how representation works – across all levels.  
 
Research Questions and Logic Models 
 
RQ1.  In US cities with more than 200,000 residents, what is the relationship between 
specific descriptive representation and racial policy in 2015, holding relevant variables 
constant? (Model 1) 
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RQ2. In US cities with more than 200,000 residents, what is the relationship between 
general descriptive representation and diversity and equity policy in 2015, holding 
relevant variables constant? (Model 2)  
 
To illustrate these research questions and the hypothesized relationships, I devised 
two theoretical equations. These equations capture the key components of my theory. I 
used two conceptions of descriptive representation: specific and general. These two 
conceptions are paired with two conceptions of representation in policy: racial policy and 
diversity policy.  
 
MODEL 1 
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 !"#$"% !"#$%&
= 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!"#$%&%$
! + 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟
+𝑚𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 +𝑚𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 + 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦
+  𝑜𝑛𝑒!"#$%"&' +  𝜀 
  
 MODEL 2 
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!"#$%&"'( !"#$%&
= 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!"#"$%& 
! + 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟
+𝑚𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 +𝑚𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 + 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦
+  𝑜𝑛𝑒!"#$%"&' +  𝜀 
 
 
I included five covariates in the models – a full discussion is in Chapter 3. They 
represent the elements that, according to the literature, also affect representation in 
policy. Therefore, they must be held constant – by including them in the model – to 
observe the true effect of descriptive representation on representation in policy. The 
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covariates represent: the city’s party ideology, the strength of the mayor, the mayor’s 
party ideology, the mayor’s race, and if there was only one minority member of the 
council.  
 An essential element of my model is the power to which descriptive 
representation is raised (i.e. the ^z notation in the models above). It represents that I am 
refuting the field’s assertion that this is a linear relationship (i.e. z=1), and that I believe 
that it is curvilinear (i.e. z>3). I test the curved nature of the relationships by running the 
model once as linear, then as quadratic, then cubic, and finally quartic.   
 
Theoretical Argument 
 
I argue that the racial composition of the legislature affects policy outcomes in 
differing ways. When the level of descriptive representation changes, the policy 
outcomes change as well. The political and electoral strategies of councilors change with 
changing levels of descriptive representation. Figure 1.3 below is a graphic representation 
of my hypothesized curvilinear relationship between the two variables. I expect to find 
this relationship both in terms of specific and general descriptive representation.   
 
13 
 
Figure 1.3 Theorized Curvilinear Relationship between Descriptive Representation 
and Representation in Policy 
 
 
 
Explicitly, I argue that policy outcomes will change in the following ways. When 
there is no descriptive representation, I posit that there will be mid-level representation in 
policy, which can be attributed to politicians trying to stave off a descriptively 
representative challenger. When there is very low descriptive representation (i.e. 
tokenism), there will very little representation in policy for the group, attributed to “white 
backlash” (Abrajano & Hajnal, 2015; Wilson, 2009). When there is mid-level descriptive 
representation (i.e. critical mass), there will be many policies passed for the group in 
question (see Mansbridge, 1999). When there is very high descriptive representation (i.e. 
majority descriptive representation), I expect to find a distinct drop in representation in 
policy. A racially defined bloc can only elect so many candidates before tapping its 
electoral power. To keep winning seats, descriptively representative candidates must 
pivot, and attract the support of other, issue-oriented voting blocs. Therefore, though the 
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number of descriptively representative legislators has increased, fewer legislators are 
electorally reliant on the racial voting bloc. Instead they pursue policies that are favored 
by the voting blocs that did elect them. Thus, in majority descriptive representation 
descriptively representative legislators will predict less representation in policy. 
Methods 
 
I use a mixed-methods approach – pairing quantitative, big-n analysis with 
nuanced case studies. I developed criteria for selecting the cases, in accordance with the 
literature: mid-sized, liberal cities with similar institutions and political trends. For the 
quantitative piece, all cities in the US with populations greater than 200,000 (n= 116) 
were included. Eight of these cities were eventually excluded from the final analysis; see 
Chapter 3 for details. I look at a cross-section of data from 20152 and identify policies of 
interest, coding them as (a) racial policy, (b) diversity policy, or (c) irrelevant to this 
study. The data collection process has simultaneously created a database for future 
research projects. Data analysis consisted of a series of regression models and ANOVA 
tests. Each iteration of the model tested specifications, like the effect of conflating 
variables and polynomials formats to test elements of my theory. This flexible approach 
is appropriate because of the exploratory nature of my project.  
The qualitative piece of my project consists of four case studies. I developed 
criteria for selecting the cases: mid-sized liberal cities, with similar institutions and 
political trends, in different regions of the country. Using these criteria, informed by the 
literature, I chose: Albuquerque, NM; Minneapolis, MN; New Orleans, LA; and Portland, 
                                                
2 Or 2014, if 2015 is an election year. 
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OR. The results from these cases follow my theoretical and hypothesized relationships 
well. In addition to providing support for my theoretical contributions, the case studies 
are essential in that they provide incredible richness and depth of understanding in terms 
of the mechanism at work. They illustrate the political context and constraints facing 
councilors and help explain why, given those factors, variable levels of representative 
policy are passed.  
 
Significance of the Study 
 
 My project contributes to the current state of knowledge in a few key ways. First, 
it marks a contribution to the theoretical field. I a look at the whole picture of 
representation, how representation works at all levels – from no descriptive 
representation to very high (i.e. majority descriptive representation). In addition to the 
theoretical contribution, there are important practical implications to this research. My 
argument is essentially that minority racial groups must choose between presence and 
political power. They can either shoot for the highest possible level of descriptive 
representation, or they can aim to wield the most power over policy. Currently, the data 
suggests that they cannot pursue both aims simultaneously. 
 This is, if nothing else, pessimistic. And the implications are grave for those who 
care about political representation as a normative good. But I argue that, with a 
perspective shift, this finding is more useful than worrisome. It calls for a new political 
strategy to leverage both presence and a political agenda. In addition to the theoretical 
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contributions, my approach to this question is new in two other ways:  (1) level of 
analysis, and (2) scope. These deviations from the field are described below.  
Level of analysis 
Considerable research has been done on representation at the state and regional 
levels. However, relatively few projects have considered representation at the local level 
(e.g. Meier, Stewart, & England, 1991). Additionally, the scholarship that does exist was 
conducted between 1990 and 2005. My work adds to the studies that seriously focus on 
local representation politics. I contend that this addition to the field will help flesh out our 
understanding of the representative mechanisms, political incentives, and institutions at 
work in cities. 
There is another reason why the level of analysis in my project is important: very 
high levels of descriptive representation have not yet been observed in the state or 
regional legislatures. These levels have occurred at the local level. This means that the 
studies that consider state and regional legislatures only consider cases with mid-level 
descriptive representation and thus are operating with a restricted range of data. The 
trends and conclusions that have been identified at the state and regional levels may only 
apply to mid-level descriptive representation. As legislatures, at any level, become more 
racially diverse then the applicability of previous studies will wane.  
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Scope: number of policies, number of cities, number of councilors 
Quantitative analyses are data-driven; the more quality data that one has access to, 
the more robust the results. The scope of my project is large. I comb through a vast 
number of policies. Over the 108 cities included in the study, I analyzed approximately 
125,000 policies. I also collected and coded the racial identification data for 1,028 city 
councilors. I have not seen another study of this magnitude. The scope of this project 
allows for robust comparison and conclusions. Further, by collecting data from so many 
cities, I circumvent the need for a longitudinal study to increase the sample size.  
Limitations of the Study 
 
There are limitations to any study and mine is no exception. One possible critique is 
that my conception of representation in policy is too narrow. My choice to use racial 
policy and diversity and equity policy was thoughtful, and is described in Chapter 2. But 
there still may be those who claim that my definition of representation in policy is too 
limited. My work does not include policy that is not explicitly about race or diversity, but 
still disproportionately affects racial minority groups. I argue that it would be 
exceedingly difficult to capture these types of policies in a systematic quantitative way. 
These policies may be identified in a qualitative way, with thorough understanding of the 
context in which they are made. But to identify this type of policy across more than 100 
city legislative contexts may be impossible – and is certainly outside of the scope of this 
project.  
Another limitation to this study arises from data availability. I planned to include all 
cities with more than 200,000 residents in the US – 116 cities, based on the 2010 census. 
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However, eight cities did not share their data in a usable format (see Chapter 3 for a 
thorough discussion). This is a limitation that was out of my control. Similarly, I had 
envisioned this study to test the relationships between three racial groups and related 
policy. However, there were so few cities with Asian representatives across the dataset 
that it was not feasible to test specific Asian descriptive representation’s effect on policy 
outcomes through regression analysis. These two limitations were due to data 
availability.  
Overview of the Dissertation 
 
There are five chapters in my dissertation. The first, here, is an introduction to the key 
ideas, themes, concepts, arguments, and conclusions that will be addressed in the 
subsequent materials. The second chapter presents a thorough treatment of my theory; I 
summarize and build upon the literature to show that by coupling together related but 
distinct concepts, I discover theoretical answers to my research questions. The third 
chapter is a discussion of my methods choices and subsequent results from testing. I 
present my research procedure in detail, so that my results can be simply replicated in the 
future. The fourth chapter presents four case studies: Albuquerque, Minneapolis, New 
Orleans, and Portland, OR. Finally, the fifth chapter of my dissertation brings all 
elements of my study together. I discuss what the key conclusions from the research are, 
and the implications of this work for both scholars and political activists.  
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CHAPTER 2. THEORY 
 
Political representation is a tenet of political science and is best understood as a 
transaction between the elected official and his constituency (Anderson, 2000; 
Mansbridge, 2003; Przeworski, 2004). A constituency elects a representative who, in 
exchange, advocates for his constituency’s preferred policies in the legislative arena. This 
transaction – votes for a voice in the political landscape – is understood by democratic 
participants; it is why we vote. Though the theory of transactional (or “economic”, as 
termed by Anderson, 2000) democracy holds across cases, how this theory manifests in 
the real world can often produce surprising results.  
The theory that I advance rests on the theoretical building blocks of rational 
choice and representational accountability. I argue the following: city-level institutional 
and structural variables consistently predict descriptive representation, but the 
relationship between descriptive representation and representation in policy is dynamic, 
varying in response to the amount of descriptive representation present.  
Rational politicians act in a way to increase the likelihood of being reelected and 
retain political power (Downs, 1957). They calculate which groups are most likely to 
support them in the next election, and use their political power to pursue policies that are 
ostensibly aligned with that group’s interests (Stone, 1993). To identify which groups 
will support the candidate in the next election, candidates use a variety of indicators 
including partisan support (e.g. running as a Democrat predicts Democratic electoral 
support) (Mcdermott, 2005), historical support (e.g. running as a labor candidate predicts 
union electoral support) (Popkin, 1995), and descriptive representation support (e.g. 
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leveraging racial voting bloc support) (Mcdermott, 1998). For all, it is a rational 
calculation about which group will best serve their interests of maintaining political 
power (Downs, 1957; Stone, 1993). 
 With different racial compositions of the city council, a politician’s rational 
calculation about which group will support them in the next election are different, and 
subsequently the politician’s policy priorities are different. I argue that the effect of 
descriptive representation on representation in policy is neither constant nor always 
positive, contrary to the expectations of the majority of the literature (e.g. Banducci, 
Donovan, & Karp, 2004; Dahlerup, 1988; Mansbridge, 1999; Swiss, Fallon, & Burgos, 
2012). Though many scholars have added nuance and subtlety to the hypothesized 
relationship between descriptive representation and representation in policy, none have 
yet taken these claims to their natural conclusions: there is a predictable relationship 
between these two variables, across all levels, but that it is curvilinear and thus not 
captured by current theory. Specifically, this curvilinear relationship implies that more 
descriptive representation can predict less representation in policy, even when holding the 
relevant variables constant. 
The local level differs from the regional and state governments in two ways that 
are relevant to this study and affect the application of previous literature to the questions 
at hand. First, the institutional constraints at the local level are different. Non-partisan 
elections, for example, have no corollary in US upper level institutions. The literature 
shows that non-partisan elections have a significant effect on descriptive representation at 
the local level (Pantoja & Segura, 2003; Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2014; Uslaner & 
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Weber, 1983; Wängnerud, 2009). Therefore, superimposing theory that was created for 
upper level politics onto the local level is problematic, as the theory will not address key 
institutional variables. Additional institutions that do not have a corollary in upper level 
US politics: non-presidential forms of government (i.e. weak mayors or council-manager 
governments), variation in electoral system (i.e. partisan versus nonpartisan elections), 
and district versus at-large constituencies. These institutions are not addressed in the bulk 
of representation literature, but tangential research has shown that they are significant 
predictors of representation. Weak mayor systems predict more representation in policy 
(Egner & Heinelt, 2008). Non-partisan elections predict more descriptive representation 
(Pantoja & Segura, 2003; Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2014; Uslaner & Weber, 1983; 
Wängnerud, 2009). District elections predict more descriptive representation (Davidson 
& Korbel, 1981; Engstrom & Mcdonald, 1981; Karnig & Welch, 1980; Leal, Martinez-
Ebers, & Meier, 2004; Robinson & Dye, 1978; Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2014; 
Trounstine & Valdini, 2008; S. Welch, 1990). Institutions matter in representation, and to 
apply national theories to the local level is to erase the importance of key local 
institutional variables. 
The second key difference between local politics in the US and state or regional 
politics in the US is the level of racial diversity. That is, local governments are markedly 
(and significantly) more racially diverse than their regional and state counterparts. Many 
scholars who discuss descriptive representation at the regional or state levels have cited 
low descriptive representation as a pitfall in their research. Grey (2006), for example, 
writes that the research setting of most studies rarely has 30% descriptive representation, 
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let alone anything higher. And she notes that this is a real hindrance for theory creation. 
Though this problem is recognized, it has not spawned a surfeit of studies on local 
representation. There is a dramatic difference in racial diversity at the regional and state 
levels versus at the local levels, as illustrated in Table 2.1 below. Values are for 2017.  
Table 2.1 Diversity in US Legislatures 2017 
Legislature Percent 
Asian3 
Percent 
Black 
Percent 
Latino4 
Percent 
Native 
American 
Percent 
white 
US Senate5 3% 3% 4% 0% 90% 
US House6 3.4% 10.6% 9% .5% 77.1% 
HI* 57% 1% 1% 0% 22% 
CA* 10% 9% 19% 0% 62% 
Santa Ana, CA †  0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
Detroit, MI † 0% 78% 11% 0% 11% 
* Most diverse state legislatures in 2017 
† Most diverse city councils in study  
 
In this chapter, I provide an overview of existing theory and literature. I begin 
with a discussion of the predictors of descriptive representation. In the second section, I 
discuss the current literature on descriptive representation’s effect on representation in 
policy.  In the third section, I provide evidence that a new theory is required, and in the 
fourth section, I present my theoretical contribution.  
 
                                                
3 Latino is a rollup category that I use throughout this study. Though the use of panethnic categories are 
supported by the literature (see Lopez & Espiritu, 1990), this practice erases the ethnic differences between 
Latino groups in the US (e.g. the difference between Mexican Americans and Cuban Americans). It is 
problematic but it is also the best method that we have to conduct quantitative analyses across cities. New 
methods and further research are called for in the future.  
4 Asian, too, is a rollup category. See Footnote 3 for discussion.  
5https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/minority_senators.htm 
6 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/24/115th-congress-sets-new-high-for-racial-ethnic-
diversity/ 
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Predictors of descriptive representation  
 
 A review of the literature indicates that there are four key predictors of descriptive 
representation. They are: city demographics, electoral system, if a city has partisan 
elections, and the city’s “partisan composition” (the term used by Reingold and Harrold 
2010, p. 281 to describe the party affiliation of city residents). Throughout this review, I 
pull from both the gender representation and racial representation bodies of literature. 
These fields are complementary, and it is exceedingly common to draw from both 
literatures. The most potent predictor of racial descriptive representation is demographics 
(Cameron, Epstein, & O’Halloran, 1996; Kanthak & Krause, 2012; Lublin, 1997). The 
predictors of racial descriptive representation markedly differ from the predictors of 
gender descriptive representation in this respect. The other three predictors – electoral 
system, partisan elections, and partisan affiliation – are prominent in both literatures.  
 The impact of district elections on descriptive representation outcomes has been 
extensively researched. Results from the research suggest a consensus: minority 
candidates tend to do better in district elections (Davidson & Korbel, 1981; Engstrom & 
Mcdonald, 1981; Karnig & Welch, 1980; Leal et al., 2004; Robinson & Dye, 1978; 
Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2014; Trounstine & Valdini, 2008; S. Welch, 1990). Though 
the field agrees on the direction of the relationship, many scholars have had added to this 
theory. Trounstine and Valdini (2008) for example, write that the effect of district 
elections on the election of African American candidates is larger, and stronger, than for 
Latino candidates. Others take an inverse approach, arguing not that district elections are 
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better for minority candidates, but that at-large elections are so much worse (Engstrom & 
Mcdonald, 1981).  
 The second predictor in the descriptive representation literature is the presence of 
partisan elections. Nonpartisan elections predict that incumbents win (Pantoja & Segura, 
2003; Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2014; Uslaner & Weber, 1983; Wängnerud, 2009). 
Voters have less information in nonpartisan elections (in that they do not know which 
party the candidate belongs to). Voters base their decisions on the information they do 
have. Incumbency, for example, has an outsized influence on voter decisions in non-
partisan elections (Krebs, 1998). Voters choose incumbents when they have little 
information, and thus incumbents do far better in nonpartisan elections (Wright, 
Schaffner, Streb, & Wright, 2001).  
 Party matters. In terms of this dissertation, a city’s partisan composition matters. 
Party predicts institutions, outcomes and, related to this discussion, descriptive 
representation. If a city consistently votes Democrat, it is more likely to elect 
representatives of color (Cameron et al., 1996; Gay, 2002; Pantoja & Segura, 2003; 
Preuhs, 2007; Reingold, 2000). The mass of evidence is further substantiated by Hajnal 
(2001), who finds a causal mechanism: cities that vote consistently for Democrats are 
more politically liberal, and cities that are more liberal tend to elect more minorities. 
 Finally, the most consistent and powerful predictor of racial descriptive 
representation: city demographics. Large populations of racial minorities predict high 
levels of descriptive representation (Karnig & Welch, 1980; Lublin, 1997; Tate, 2001). 
This connection has been investigated at all levels of government – from regional and 
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state to local bodies -- and the results are the same. Results are consistent whether one 
studies majority-minority voting districts for US Congress (Cameron et al., 1996; Lublin, 
1999) or school board elections (Browning, Marshall, & Tabb, 1997; Meier & England, 
1984).  More racial diversity in the constituency predicts more racial diversity in the 
legislature.   
 Considered in concert these four variables create a robust predictive theoretical 
model for descriptive representation. If there are more members of a minority group in 
the city, expect more descriptive representation. If there is a district type election in the 
city, expect more descriptive representation. If there are partisan elections, expect more 
descriptive representation. And, finally, if the city tends to vote Democrat, expect more 
descriptive representation.  
 
Figure 2.1 City Variables affecting Descriptive Representation 
 
 
Descriptive Representation’s effect on Representation in Policy – and a discussion of 
Substantive Representation  
 
There may be consensus about what factors predict descriptive representation; the 
field is much more divided when the discussion turns to how descriptive representation 
affects representation in policy. Though it feels intuitively like there should be a link 
between the two, the evidence is tenuous and the fight is contentious. 
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The most prominent theme in the substantive representation literature7 is an 
exploration of whether descriptive representation is, or is not, a significant predictor of 
substantive representation. Nearly all articles about substantive representation are looking 
for some sort of causal relationship – testing sets of variables and covariates to determine 
an explanation for changes in substantive representation. There are countless studies 
about descriptive representation alone (Google Scholar returns 743,000 results to the 
query “political AND descriptive representation”), whereas there are far fewer that 
discuss substantive representation without descriptive (the parallel search returns 308,000 
articles).  
There are divergent findings when considering if, and when, descriptive 
representation predicts substantive representation. There are scholars who argue that 
there is a strong, substantiated link between the two, that they are “linked in significant 
ways” (Gerber, Morton, & Rietz, 1998, p. 127) (e.g. Bratton & Haynie, 1999; Leal et al., 
2004; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012; Swiss et al., 2012; Tate, 2001; Taylor-Robinson & 
Heath, 2003; Thomas, 1991; Whitby & Krause, 2001). Many have added nuance to the 
relationship, like finding support only when socioeconomic and institutional variables are 
held constant (e.g. Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012) or when substantive representation is 
defined in terms of policies with concentrated  - as opposed to diffuse – benefits  (Whitby 
& Krause, 2001). 
For every scholar who argues that descriptive representation leads to more 
substantive representation, there is someone who argues that there is no evidence of the 
                                                
7 Though previous researchers have used substantive representation as an operationalized variable – an 
approach that I disagree with –they have made substantial contributions to the way we understand political 
representation 
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link (Vega & Firestone, 1995) (e.g. Banducci et al., 2004; Dovi, 2002). Others write that 
though the theory is compelling, the empirical evidence of substantive representation 
following descriptive representation is inconclusive (Childs & Krook, 2008; Vega & 
Firestone, 1995). Some find that more descriptive representation leads to less support of 
minority-sponsored legislation (Cameron et al., 1996) and a decrease in effective policy 
making (Carroll, 2001). Some say that this is because minority members of congress 
sponsor fewer bills and are less politically active than their white counterparts (Rocca & 
Sanchez, 2007). Others have found simply no evidence of the link at all both in the US 
(Z. L. Hajnal, 2001; Hero & Tolbert, 1995) and in international contexts (Johnson III, 
1998). “If the presumption is that all women or all black people share the same 
preferences and goals, this is clearly – and dangerously – erroneous” (Phillips, 1995, p. 
157).  
And there are many studies that corroborate Phillips’ normative argument. 
Though most scholars acknowledge the logical appeal of the descriptive representation – 
substantive representation link, they point to a dearth of empirical evidence  
(e.g. Childs & Krook, 2008). There are those whose results show, explicitly, that 
descriptive representation has not led to increased substantive representation for Latinos 
(Hero & Tolbert, 1995), African Americans (Z. L. Hajnal, 2001; Lublin, 1997; Shotts, 
2003) or women (Childs & Krook, 2009). Finally, there are scholars who argue that there 
are far more important predictors of substantive representation. Institutions, for example, 
are cited as the most important indicator of policy outcomes (Peterson, 1995; 
Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2014; Trounstine & Valdini, 2008).  
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In addition to those who categorically argue in favor or against a link, there are 
those who add a wrinkle to the argument. Far and away, the most cogent nuance added to 
this theory is critical mass. Critical mass theorists argue that there is a positive 
relationship between the two variables – after descriptive representation has reached a 
certain point. This idea was championed first by Dahlerup (1988, 2006) and then turned 
into a full fledged theory by Mansbridge (1999). They argue that minority groups (i.e. 
racial minorities or women) must gain a certain percentage of the legislature before they 
can effectively influence policy. Kanter and Dahlerup both argue that once critical mass 
is achieved, once a large minority is gained, the increase in policy outcomes is not a 
simple, steady linear slope – it is exponential. Representation in policy is not a constant 
function of descriptive representation; when descriptive representation achieves a certain 
magnitude, the returns in representation in policy are vast.  
The problem with critical mass is that, despite decades of research, there is no 
consensus within the field as to the level of descriptive representation that must be 
achieved before subsequent policy gains come to fruition. Where Dahlerup defined 
critical mass (or “large minority” to use her phrase from the 1988 article) as more than 
20%, Mansbridge argues that 30% is the actual threshold, and Epstein and O’Halloran 
(1999) argue that 45% is more likely to be correct. This infighting has led some scholars 
to argue that while critical mass is an appealing theory, the inability to substantiate it 
with evidence is problematic – and perhaps implies that the theory itself is flawed 
(Beckwith & Cowell-Meyers, 2007). 
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Since the publication of these seminal works, the argument about the exact value 
of critical mass has become stauncher, and more important to subsequent research (Vega 
& Firestone, 1995). Some say critical mass can be observed when the minority 
population reaches just 20% (e.g. Swiss et al., 2012); others directly dispute that claim 
(Beckwith & Cowell-Meyers, 2007). Others complicate it by saying, for example, 45% is 
the critical mass cut point, but only when the city’s demographics are 45% minority, too 
(Epstein & O’Halloran, 1998). For most, these divergences do not negate the importance 
of critical mass as a theory8, however. As stated, critical mass has been developed in the 
theoretical realm; researchers have found a theoretical grounding to be sufficient for their 
research. My project, however, requires an actual critical mass value; that is, my research 
design requires the testing of explicit values. Fortunately, the research design also 
provides ample opportunity to test the theoretical cut points that have been previously 
suggested by the literature; see Chapter 3 for a thorough discussion. Though the 
theoretical base of critical mass is solid, the practical, applicable definition is not.  
In this project, I test an applied critical mass in an appropriately diverse setting. 
As Grey et al. (2006) writes, this undertaking is relatively rare and therefore this is a main 
contribution of my work. When there has been applied research, the field is marked with 
stark divergences about the predictive power of critical mass. Perhaps some of this 
conflict arises from a striking gap in the theoretical literature:  an agreed upon definitive 
value of critical mass. Indeed, the foundation of the field is based on this rift: Kanter 
writes that critical mass is defined as 40% of a legislature; Dahlerup writes that it is 
                                                
8Some say that critical mass theory is under-theorized. They argue that because there is no agreed-upon 
value for critical mass, so it is impossible to systematically study (Beckwith & Cowell-Meyers, 2007). 
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defined as 30% of the legislature. Theoretically, this difference may be unimportant. 
When it comes to testing the theory, however, it is critical.  
In summary, there are decades of research about substantive representation and its 
causes. Yet the field has not reached consensus. There are powerful arguments and 
evidence supporting that descriptive representation leads to substantive representation. 
But there are equally powerful arguments and evidence claiming that there is no causal 
relationship. This split in the field is not unique, but it is troubling. I argue that the 
relationship between descriptive representation and substantive representation is much 
more complex than the scholarship presented here and that, when thinking of it as a 
multi-dimensional, curvilinear relationship, many of these arguments are not actually at-
odds, but part of a larger picture.  
The argument against ‘Substantive Representation’ 
 
 Pitkin defines substantive representation as when a legislator acts in the best 
interest of a group. Theoretically, this is clear. But identifying examples of this is 
difficult, she writes; it is very hard identify the best interests of a group (Phillips, 1995; 
Pitkin, 1967). Pitkin concludes that substantive representation may never be measurable 
in a quantitative sense. 
Pitkin was explicit in her skepticism of an operationalized, quantitative 
substantive representation. Despite the warning, countless scholars have done exactly 
this. Most have used substantive representation as a tool for talking about policy 
outcomes, for identifying when a legislator is acting for a stated group. Those scholars 
who have tried to thoroughly understand and measure operationalized substantive 
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representation wind up tangled in complex strains of logic and methods. For example, 
Bratton and Haynie (1999) try to operationalize substantive representation in terms of 
Black interest bills writing,  
Black interest legislation includes those bills that may decrease 
racial discrimination or alleviate the effects of such 
discrimination, and those that are intended to improve the 
socioeconomic status of African Americans. Some specific 
examples are: a bill that requires school integration and a bill 
that increases funding of sickle-cell anemia research… Bills 
that, in the judgment of the authors, hindered the social, 
economic or political advancement of African Americans or 
women were not included in these categories. For example, bills 
that attempted to preserve school segregation or end affirmative 
action were not considered black interest bills 
  (Bratton & Haynie, 1999) 
This definition relies almost entirely on the discretion of the researcher. Scholars must 
judge, case-by-case, whether the legislation supports Black interests. The possibilities for 
Type I and II errors are staggering, never mind that the idea of “Black interests” is an 
inherently subjective criterion. Ask 10 different scholars – or politicians, or community 
members - what is in the best interest of the Black community and you will have 10 
different answers. As a rubric for identifying representative policy – the crucial 
dependent variable – relying only on the “judgment of the authors” is, at best, impossible 
to replicate. At worst, it is entirely unscientific.  
 This is not my only problem with the treatment of substantive representation. 
Even if a researcher were to overcome the issue of systematically identifying the 
supposed substantive representation bills, there is another major hurdle. The definition of 
substantive representation requires assumptions about the mindset of the legislator. The 
method that is used frequently assumes that the researcher and the legislator have the 
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same beliefs about what benefits a group. Further, it implies that the legislator and the 
researcher both have perfect information – or at least both have the exact same 
information. Both the legislator and the researcher have to have the same understanding 
of the context of the bill, the impacts of the bill, and the politics of the bill. These pieces 
of information are the only way to determine whether legislation is in the best interest of 
a group. To say that a legislator is actively substantively representing a group would 
mean that the researcher knows exactly what the legislator knows about bill and have 
made the same determinations.  
 In summary, substantive representation should not be operationalized. It is too 
nebulous a term. It is subjective; to measure it, a researcher has to rely too heavily on his 
judgment. Further, identifying supposed cases of substantive representation implies that 
the researcher and the legislator have exactly the same information. They both know 
exactly the impact of the bill – including unintended short and long term consequences, – 
the politics of the bill and the context in which the bill came to be. It is simply not 
possible, nor scientific, to use an operationalized substantive representation variable in a 
quantitative study.  
 
 
Building a New Theory 
 
Briefly, the literature says that there are three steps in the relationship between 
descriptive representation and representation in policy. First, voters use descriptive 
representation as an information shortcut and, using stereotypes, make assumptions about 
33 
 
the policy preferences of candidates and vote accordingly. Second, councilors know this, 
and will pursue policies that ostensibly align with the largest voting bloc(s), which are 
sometimes defined along racial lines. Third, a descriptively representative legislator will 
pursue the policies preferred by a racial group in attempts to secure electoral support in 
the next election. Below, I discuss each of the steps in the mechanism. I summarize the 
literature, and identify gaps.    
Candidates run, and the voters use information shortcuts to better understand the 
policy preferences of the candidates (Bartels, 1996; Carey, 2009; Chang & Golden, 2007; 
Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Lupia, 1994; Mcdermott, 1998; Shugart, Valdini, & Suominen, 
2005). It is neither feasible nor efficient for voters to learn about the policy preferences of 
all candidates. The most salient information shortcut is political party; voters read a 
candidate’s political party affiliation as an indicator of policy preferences. There are 
many cases, however, when political party is either not a pertinent factor (e.g. 
competition between candidates of the same party), or is not known (e.g. non-partisan 
elections). Voters then take cues from candidates’ biographical information to gauge 
policy preferences. Pertinent biographical information includes place of birth or gender 
(Shugart et al., 2005), and race (Mcdermott, 1998). Voters use these cues to determine 
which candidate most likely shares their view on policies, and cast their ballots 
accordingly.  
Many voters vote in a bloc. Blocs can be delimitated on party lines, on occupation 
lines (e.g. unions), and on racial lines (Collet, 2005; Z. Hajnal & Trounstine, 2005). In 
many ways, winning over voting blocs or cohorts is a safe way to win an election; it is 
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the relative guarantee of electoral support. Voting blocs support a candidate because of 
policy preferences, both stated and assumed. That is, the candidate may explicitly address 
the concerns of a voting bloc, or use other cues to signal policy preferences. Either way, 
the votes of the bloc are secured when the bloc believes that its preferred policies are the 
preferred policies of the candidate.   
Consider the hypothetical Voting Bloc A and Candidate A, where Bloc A makes 
up a substantial portion of the votes cast for Candidate A.  Candidate A wins his election, 
thanks in large part to Bloc A, and begins to govern. In addition to governing, now-
Legislator A starts the process of retaining power. Every decision that a legislator makes 
is both about policy and about positioning. Legislator A needs to retain the support that 
got him into office. To lose that support while in office could mean losing his seat in the 
next election. One of the few things that political scientists agree on is that those who 
have power want to retain their power. The rational Legislator A will act in a way to 
retain power.  
Legislator A is making decisions based on both his appraisal of good policy as 
well as favorable political positioning in terms of those who elected him. He knows that 
Bloc A was responsible, in part, for his electoral success. And so, to retain those votes in 
the next election, he will skew his policy preferences towards Bloc A. Skewing his policy 
preferences is a form of responsiveness (Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999). He does 
this for two reasons, both of which aim to secure him future legislative power. First, he is 
aware of the mandate of his constituency. Candidate A made promises during the 
election, skewing himself towards Bloc A to win its support. Now that he is a legislator, 
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he knows that Bloc A expects a policy agenda that reflects those campaign positions. 
Following through on those promises is upholding the mandate and appeasing his base. 
Second, Legislator A is afraid of being sanctioned by his constituency; that is, he is afraid 
that if the constituency does not like what he has done in office, they will use the 
accountability mechanisms available to them (i.e. their vote) and elect a different 
candidate (Przeworski et al., 1999). The responsiveness, mandate, and desire to avoid 
being sanctioned coalesce to ensure that a) Bloc A supports Legislator A in the next 
election, and b) Bloc A’s policy preferences are translated into a policy agenda. 
 
Figure 2.2 Traditional Understanding of Representation in Policy 
 
 
Now, in place of Bloc A, consider African American voters. In place of Candidate 
A, consider an African American candidate. The hypothetical logic above, when applied, 
perfectly illustrates why people assume a link between descriptive and substantive 
representations. Politicians must act to retain their electoral support if they want to win 
the next election – and thus they promote the political agenda of the group that won them 
the election. See Figure 2.3 below.  My argument, however, is that this relationship 
works only to a point.  
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Figure 2.3 Applying the Traditional Approach to Representation in Policy 
 
However, I argue that this only works to a point. The political positioning of 
representatives will change in accordance with the racial composition of the council. The 
beginning of this new understanding is illustrated in Figure 2.4 below, a graphic 
representation of the hypothesized relationship between descriptive representation and 
representation in policy. I argue that there are four stages of descriptive representation: no 
descriptive representation, tokenism, critical mass, and majority descriptive 
representation. Each of these stages predicts a different level of representation in policy, 
some of which has been covered by existing theory, some of which is wholly new. The 
following section details the theoretical rationale for the predicted values of 
representation in policy.  
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Figure 2.4 Theorized Curvilinear Relationship between Descriptive Representation 
and Representation in Policy 
 
 
 
No descriptive representation 
 
A council with no African Americans councilors has no African American 
descriptive representation.  In a council with no descriptive representation, I argue that 
we will see a mid-level amount of representation in policy. This hypothesis – that no 
descriptive representation predicts mid-level policy outcomes – is contrary to the logic in 
much of the current research. Current research suggests that a linear, positive relationship 
describes the interaction between descriptive representation and representation in policy. 
The logic underpinning these models is that more descriptive representation means more 
representation in policy, and the inverse logic is that less descriptive representation 
means less representation in policy. To hypothesize mid-level policy outcomes when 
there is no descriptive representation contradicts the basic assumption that the only way 
to have more representation in policy is to have more descriptive representation.  
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However, my argument for this hypothesis comes straight from the theoretical 
foundations of political science. Politicians in power want – and act – to retain power 
(Downs, 1957). Politicians who are not descriptively representative of the population are 
vulnerable to a challenger. Politicians know that in the future, they may be vulnerable to 
a challenge by someone who is descriptively representative (Epstein & O’Halloran, 
1999a; Nelson, 2007). Logically, it follows that they will act to preempt a challenge 
through representation in policy.  
White councilors that sense a gap in representation will act to fill that gap, and 
thus avoid a challenger from a descriptively representative candidate. White council 
members can appear representative by pursuing a policy agenda that is reflective of the 
under-represented group. They will promote policies that are representative of other 
community groups so as to prevent a challenge by a non-white candidate.  
 However, there is a limit to the amount of representative policy that white 
councilors will pursue. The councilors will pass enough legislation to stave off a 
challenge; but there is no need to go beyond the minimum. Pursuing policy – any policy 
– takes political capital (Kjaer, 2015; Stone, 1993). To pursue representative policy 
means jeopardizing the success of other policy platforms. Strategically, an all white 
council will pass enough policies to prevent a challenge from minority candidates – but 
no more.  
 Literature suggests that white and minority legislators promote different policy 
agendas when in office (Juenke & Preuhs, 2012), and thus it follows that white councilors 
would not promote the same representation in policy as minority councilors. In other 
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words, in accordance with the logic of current literature, an all white council would 
predict essentially no representative policy for minority constituencies. My theory differs 
from this underpinning logic, but I argue that this is because of the dearth of empirical 
studies of representative policy with no descriptive representation. The rationale for a 
councilor functioning in a no-descriptive-representation situation will look like Figure 2.5 
below.  
 
Figure 2.5 No Descriptive Representation 
 
  For example, there are no Black councilors on the Seattle city council in 2015 
(there are seven white councilors and two Asian councilors). Based on previous literature, 
one might assume that this means very little substantive representation for Black 
residents. However, Seattle aligns with the theory presented here. An example of Black 
policy in Seattle was Resolution 31578, which reaffirmed support for Somali 
communities in Seattle. This policy passed unanimously, meaning that all council 
members voted in support of a racial policy without any related descriptive 
representation. Even though there were no Black councilors, .259% of policies passed 
were Black racial policies. This value is close to the average amount of Black policy 
passed across cases (.294%) – and thus Seattle is the very picture of mid-level policy 
outcomes. 
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Figure 2.6 Hypothesized Relationship, No Descriptive Representation and Policy 
Outcomes 
 
 
 
Tokenism 
Tokenism is the period of very low descriptive representation, indicated by either 
a very small percentage and/or a single representative in a legislature. This is when I 
expect to see the worst policy outcomes for represented groups. The literature provides 
compelling support of this hypothesis; there are various theoretical explanations in the 
literature, and I develop a composite theoretical explanation here.  
 Kanthak and Krause (2012) write that tokenism is a powerful and encumbering 
phenomenon. The token councilor must hold the entire mantle of representation in policy. 
This translates into undue pressure upon the councilor and stagnation in terms of the 
policy outcomes of represented group. One person cannot pass legislation by himself; and 
yet that is exactly what is expected of the token minority council member. This 
understanding of the effects of tokenism underpins the logic of councilors in the low 
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descriptive representation stage. It, in part, explains why such low representation in 
policy occurs in this type. 
In addition to the negative effects of tokenism on policy outcomes, Kanthak and 
Krause highlight that backlash from the majority group can be expected during the 
tokenism period. Backlash – the idea that the majority group will act to undercut the 
efforts of the minority group – can forestall the policy efforts of a minority group. The 
idea of white backlash is present in politics at every level. William Julius Wilson (1998, 
2009) discusses white backlash extensively in his work, citing it as one reason that the 
urban African American population’s progressive political efforts are have been stymied 
by white hegemons. Though Wilson’s concept was not developed to talk about 
descriptive representation, other scholars have applied it explicitly to racial and 
representation politics (Cameron et al., 1996; Crowley, 2014; Epstein & O’Halloran, 
1999a). In the tokenism period, white backlash is one explanation for low representation 
in policy. 
   
 
Figure 2.7 Tokenism 
 
 To illustrate low representation in policy during the tokenism period, consider 
Philadelphia. During 2014, Philadelphia had one Latino councilor on a council of 17, 
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translating to about 6% of the council. A sole member of a racial group indicates the 
tokenism period. During the study year, only .12% of the policies passed were Latino 
racial policies. This is a low value, particularly when compared to the average amount of 
Latino racial policy passed across all cases (.20%). Further, the one Latina councilor 
(Councilor Quiñones-Sánchez) sponsored every piece of Latino policy that was passed by 
the council. This, at least, speaks to Kanthak and Krause’s point about tokenism: that the 
few members of the group are responsible for spearheading all representation in policy. 
 
Figure 2.8 Hypothesized Relationship, Tokenism and Policy Outcomes 
 
 
 
Critical Mass  
 
Critical mass theory is truly a theoretical touchstone in the field. If Pitkin 
engendered the modern study of political representation, Kanter (1977) engendered the 
discussion of representation in policy for minority groups. She explores what it means for 
women to be tokens, and when we can expect that tokenism to subside. She wrote about a 
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type of representation in which women moved from tokens to real, powerful decision 
makers. This idea – that a minority group can gain decision-making power – is incredibly 
powerful. It reshaped the field’s understanding of minority politics.  
In the critical mass period, I expect to see a lot of representation in policy. There 
is sufficient momentum and collegial support to pursue the policy agenda of minority 
group (Dahlerup, 1988; Kanter, 1977; Mansbridge, 1999). Additionally, the voting bloc 
power of the minority constituency has not been split across too many descriptively 
representative councilors, as will happen in majority descriptive representation. Minority 
councilors can pursue policy agendas without experiencing white backlash, and have 
sufficient strategic motivation to pursue representation in policy for racial groups. Racial 
policy and diversity policy will be buffeted because there is no strategic reason to impede 
them. The resulting logic (presented below in Figure 2.9) predicts high representation in 
policy. 
 
Figure 2.9 Critical Mass 
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 Critical mass occurs in the dataset in many places, including in Austin. Latino 
councilors make up 30%9 of the council during the study year. I argue that in the critical 
mass period, representation in policy will be quite high. In Austin, .51% of the policies 
passed during the study year were Latino racial policies. This is more than twice the 
average across cases (mean equals .20%). 
  
 
Figure 2.10 Hypothesized Relationship, Critical Mass and Policy Outcomes 
 
 
 
Majority Descriptive Representation 
 
Majority descriptive representation is chronically under-researched in the field. I 
hypothesize that the high descriptive representation that defines this period predicts low 
representation in policy outcomes. This may seem contrary to logic; it certainly runs 
contrary to much of the literature. However, I argue that low representation in policy will 
                                                
9 I discuss this more in the Methods and Results chapter, for my purposes 30% is in the critical mass 
period. 
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occur because the electoral strategy of councilors has changed in response to a diverse 
council makeup. In short, intra-racial competition forces candidates to differentiate 
themselves by aligning themselves with voting blocs outside the racial group. 
Descriptive representation functions as an effective information shortcut in other 
types, but its impact in the majority descriptive representation type is different. When 
there is considerable competition between minority candidates (i.e. intra-racial 
competition), the positive effect of descriptive representation is negated. No longer can 
voters rely on the information shortcuts that descriptive representation provides – because 
descriptive representation connotes the same thing for all candidates involved. The 
information gleaned from the information shortcut provides the same information for all 
descriptively representative candidates. Therefore the power of descriptive representation 
wanes. 
Though majority descriptive representation is understudied in the traditional 
political context, it has been considered in other ways. The closest parallel is the study of 
electoral structures that promote racial and ethnic diversity in legislatures. Racially based 
quotas are one context in which scholars have studied intra-racial electoral competition. 
For example, in New Zealand, there is a separate electoral roll comprised entirely of 
Maori candidates10; this roll serves to populate reserved seats in the national legislature 
and only the Maori constituency can vote for these candidates (Banducci et al., 2004; 
Braswell, 2010). Studies have used this perfect natural experiment on intra-racial political 
competition to better understand minority participation (Banducci et al., 2004), a 
constituency’s satisfaction with government (Banducci et al., 2004), how race aligns with 
                                                
10 The Maori population is the largest racial minority in the country, and the Indigenous population. 
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party affiliation (M. Htun, 2004), and how government defines race and ethnicity 
(Kukutai, 2004). Yet no one is using it to explain intra-racial political competition. That 
is, there is still a dearth of literature that explores how candidates position themselves 
when in direct competition with other descriptively representative candidates.  
In the American context, the closest studies of majority descriptive representation 
focus on the impact of majority-minority national electoral districts drawn in the 1990s. 
Canon et al. (1996), in particular, study the electoral strategy of Black politicians in 
majority-minority districts. Their findings run contrary to the literature of the time, which 
had suggested that majority-minority districts would lead to the extreme representation in 
policy for Black constituencies. The study suggests that Black candidates skew their 
political strategy away from extremes, instead adopting a median voter (Downs, 1957) 
type approach. That is, Black politicians in majority-minority districts adopt the “politics 
of commonality” (D. T. Canon et al., 1996, p. 846) and promote policies that are not 
racially motivated. Instead, they promote policies that have a broad, biracial consensus in 
the constituency. Though Canon et al. stop short of theorizing about the political 
motivations in intra-racial competition outside of majority-minority contexts, his logic 
holds. As opposed to appealing only to one’s racial base, candidates must pursue a policy 
agenda that attracts support from a diverse set of voters. In terms of my work, this means 
less representation in policy.  
Majority descriptive representation of an identity group is not unique to racial 
descriptive representation. Gender descriptive representation has a similar type. When 
there are many women competing for the same thing, the power of gender as an 
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information shortcut is null. For instance, consider the women-only ballots in Rwanda. 
Voters have a number of women candidates to choose from, but gender is no longer a 
distinction between the candidates. Other information is used to make a choice (Dahlerup 
& Freidenvall, 2005).  
Similarly, party affiliation is considered the most salient information shortcut 
(Popkin, 1995). When there are multiple candidates running with the same party 
affiliation, in the same race, the power of party affiliation wanes (Shugart et al., 2005; 
Valdini, 2006). For example, in a proportional representation open list electoral system, 
voters can vote for a party and an individual within the party. In this case, party affiliation 
does not serve as a differentiator between candidates, and thus provides no additional 
information to the voter (Shugart et al., 2005; Valdini, 2006). Similarly, the effect of 
party is mitigated in the US in primary competitions. Presidential primary competitions in 
the US intraparty competitions; that is, candidates are, by design, only competing against 
those with the same party affiliation. Therefore, just as in the PR list ballot, the 
competition is intraparty and voters must use other cues to read the candidates (Branton, 
2009). 
When there is considerable intra-racial competition (i.e. majority descriptive 
representation), I expect the outcomes to be markedly different from the critical mass 
period. Additional minority representatives do not predict more representative policy. 
Instead, more descriptive representation predicts lower representation in policy, because 
the appropriate electoral strategy is to cultivate electoral support from other voting blocs. 
When political strategy becomes about something other than race, political motivations 
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become more akin to traditional (i.e. a-racial) political posturing. Political candidates 
make policy promises to voting blocs that are not defined on racial lines. Candidates will 
reach out to the business community, to education interests, to those concerned about 
criminal justice. They will position themselves differently to attract the votes needed to 
win. In other words, a Black candidate cannot expect to win based on descriptive 
representation when he is running against another Black candidate (D. T. Canon et al., 
1996). He has to distinguish himself in the field. He has to be the business candidate that 
is Black – and to attract the support of the business community, he has to skew his policy 
agenda during the campaign. Successful candidates who will seek reelection must keep in 
mind their constituency when they are in office. This is the accountability theory of 
democracy: candidates make promises during the campaign, and carry them out when in 
office (Przeworski et al., 1999).  
This theory applies to all politicians, not just those who are looking to cultivate 
the minority vote. All candidates look for voting blocs (Collet, 2005; Gormley & 
Murphy, 2008). All candidates try to woo blocs with policy promises (Butler, 2009; Z. L. 
Hajnal, 2009). If the promises woo enough votes, the candidate wins the seat. If the 
councilor wants to maintain the electoral support that he gained during the election, he 
needs to appear like he is fulfilling his promises (Aragones, Palfrey, & Postlewaite, 2007; 
Przeworski et al., 1999). A candidate who has distinguished himself from other Black 
candidates has made promises to other voting blocs. When in office, he must pursue their 
preferred policies. To not, to pursue policies preferred by others, would risk alienation of 
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the voters and the loss of electoral support and mandate (Aragones et al., 2007; 
Przeworski et al., 1999).  
This explains why a candidate may advocate for interests outside minority 
constituency. I am not arguing that the minority councilor will wholly abandon the 
minority constituency and only advocate for the other voting blocs. Instead, I am arguing 
that the councilor’s priority has become the other voting blocs. During the critical mass 
period, the rationale to pursue representation in policy is much stronger than in the 
majority descriptive representation period. Thus, the predicted value of representation in 
policy in the majority descriptive representation period is significantly less than in the 
critical mass period (see Figure 2.11).  
 
Figure 2.11 Majority Descriptive Representation 
 
 
 Atlanta is a ready example of majority descriptive representation aligning with 
low representation in policy. Black councilors make up 69% of the council during the 
study period. Yet, in terms of representation in policy, the Black constituency does not 
fair well. Across all cases, Black racial policy made up .294% of all policies passed. In 
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Atlanta, however, Black racial policy constituted .089% -- nearly 2.5 times less than the 
national average.  
 
Figure 2.12 Hypothesized Relationship, Majority Descriptive Representation and 
Policy Outcomes 
 
Conclusion 
In order to better understand the relationship between descriptive representation 
and representation in policy, I conducted a sweeping review of the relevant literature. The 
results of this review indicated that a new theory was required to better explain the latter 
link (i.e. how descriptive representation predicts policy outcomes). I therefore have 
developed a new theory, by pulling theoretical elements form disparate bodies of 
literature. This new theory predicts that the relationship in question is curvilinear in 
nature and, perhaps most surprisingly, it suggests that when descriptive representation is 
very high, representation in policy will be low.  
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CHAPTER 3. QUANTIATIVE METHODS AND RESULTS 
I have developed a multi-pronged, extensive approach to nearly every element of 
the project. The data collection, for example, has resulted in a very large database – larger 
than any other I have seen in the field. In my approach to data analysis, too, I took great 
pains to be complete. I used not just regression analysis but ANOVAs as well – so as to 
better understand and illustrate the true nature of the relationship at play. I then paired the 
quantitative analyses with case studies, rounding out my understanding of the 
mechanisms at work. I took care at each juncture of the project and this has created an 
epic project with compelling results.  
In this chapter, I outline the quantitative methods and results. I find support for 
the main argument. Overall, I find compelling evidence that the theory that I have 
advanced in the previous chapters of this dissertation has merit. The organization of this 
chapter is as follows. I first restate the research questions and the related hypotheses. I 
then discuss the foundation of the research design, including the research setting (case 
selection and target year) and the operationalization of the target policies. Then I describe 
the extensive data collection process. Next, I describe the data coding and cleaning 
procedures that ensured validity of the study, as well as describing covariates and the 
construction of the database. I then describe the data analysis procedures and results from 
each set of tests. Finally, I discuss the validity and reliability of the methods choices I 
have used.  
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Restating the Research Questions 
 To explain my methods choices, and formally outline my hypotheses, here I 
restate my research questions. After each question, I list the related hypotheses. After 
that, I explain my methodological and methods choices emanating from the questions. 
The methodological choices that I made were explicitly related to the research questions 
and the fundamental motivation of the study.  To better explain these choices, I have 
restated the questions below. In this section, I tie the research questions to my hypotheses 
and then explain each testing method that I used.  
 
Research Question 1.  In US cities with more than 200,000 residents, what is the 
relationship between specific descriptive representation and racial policy in 2015, holding 
relevant variables constant?  
 
Hypothesis 1: In the linear model, specific descriptive representation will not be a 
significant positive predictor of racial policy. 
Hypothesis 2: The best fit model will be when z (that is, the power to which descriptive 
representation is raised) is more than two, indicating that the nature of the relationship is 
not linear (where z would be equal to 1) and not quadratic (where z would equal 2), but 
curvilinear.   
I was interested in knowing how the theoretically curvilinear relationship between 
descriptive representation and representation in policy is best modeled as a polynomial. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 get at that question. They provide operationalized and testable 
approaches to determining the correct functional form. To determine if these hypotheses 
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were substantiated by the data, I conducted a series of regressions. Each iteration of the 
regression equation was identical, except for the functional form of descriptive 
representation. I tested the models using descriptive representation as a straight 
percentage, as well as quadratic, cubic, and quartic functional forms.  
There are six covariates in the model, in addition to the polynomial expression of 
specific descriptive representation. I tested four models – from linear to quartic – to 
gauge goodness of fit and test my hypotheses. I did not use robust standard errors, as the 
number of cases was not large enough to justify such a strain on statistical power (Kezdi, 
2003; Wooldridge, 2003). I did not cluster by region, or other variable. Instead, I 
included the pertinent variables in the model.  
 
Research Question 2. In US cities with more than 200,000 residents, what is the 
relationship between general descriptive representation and diversity and equity policy in 
2015, holding constant other relevant variables?  
 
Hypothesis 3: In the linear model, general descriptive representation will not be a 
significant positive predictor of diversity policy. 
Hypothesis 4: The best fit model will be when z (that is, the power to which descriptive 
representation is raised) is more than two, indicating that the nature of the relationship is 
not linear (where z would be equal to 1) and not quadratic (where z would equal 2), but 
curvilinear.   
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 I performed a parallel process to test general descriptive representation’s affect on 
diversity policy. I tested multiple iterations of the regression equation – identical save for 
the power to which general descriptive representation was raised. I gauged goodness of 
fit of each model, comparing them to ascertain which model had the most explanatory 
power.  
 
Research Design 
I designed this aspect of the research project to quantitatively assess the 
hypotheses and theoretical models introduced in the previous chapter. I set parameters of 
the study, collected the intended data, initiated a procedure of cleaning, coding and 
setting up the data for analysis, and proceeded with a data analysis procedure that is 
substantiated by the literature. These elements are described in this subsection.  
Case selection, Sampling 
 The population of this study is city councils in all US cities with more than 
200,000 residents, as indicated by the 2010 US Census. According to the Census, 116 
cities fit this criterion (see Appendix A for list of cities included in the study). Using the 
entire population of city councils presents a number of distinct benefits. First, studies of 
the population circumvent issues of sampling integrity (Kumar, 2011). Sampling always 
allows for the possibility that the sample does not mirror the target population (Ethridge, 
2002); studying the population in its entirety removes this risk. The second benefit is that 
there is no need for a complex sampling strategy that incorporates and weighs different 
variables for inclusion. The process without sampling is streamlined and efficient and 
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easily replicable. Though including the entire population required more data collection, it 
simplified the procedures overall.  
Target year of the data 
My study is temporally cross sectional as I am most interested in the interplay of 
race and policy, and less interested in the change of this relationship over time. Cross 
sectional data provides a snapshot of the world in one point in time. The addition of a 
temporal element would require that I include confounding variables that are associated 
with time. By using cross-sectional data, I am able to hold time-dependent variables 
constant. This not only streamlines the study and aligns it with trends in the current 
literature (e.g. Bueno & Dunning, 2017; Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2014), but also 
allows me to focus on the relationships between the primary independent and dependent 
variables. There is substantially less statistical noise when a cross-sectional approach is 
used (Bailey, 2008).  
The main target year for this study is 2015. However, my study requires that there 
were no changes to the council during the study period (i.e. the representatives who 
served at the beginning of the year must be the same as those who served at the end of the 
year). If there was a change in council, I could not attribute the year’s policy outcomes to 
one set of councilors, because this would undermine my thesis, that the composition of 
the council predicts policy outcomes. Therefore, when there was a change in 
representation in 2015, I used 2014 as the study year. A complete list of cities for which 
2014 was used is included in Appendix A. 
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Key variable operationalization and data collection 
Descriptive Representation -- Conceptualization and Operationalization 
Descriptive representation is the idea that there is import in being represented by 
an individual who shares the same primary characteristic. In this study, I have 
conceptualized descriptive representation in two ways: specific and general. Specific 
descriptive representation is the percent of councilmembers who identify as a specific 
racial group (i.e. for this study, the percent of the council that identifies as Black, Asian 
and Latino). General descriptive representation is the percent of councilmembers who 
identify as any racial minority group.  
Data collection and Coding Processes 
The data collection process for descriptive representation mirrors the information 
processing of voters. I examined photographs, newspaper articles, biographical data, and 
organization memberships to find a councilor’s racial identity. This process aligns with 
the literature (Barrett & Barrington, 2005; Druckman, 2004). Unlike, US mayors11, there 
is no repository for the race of city councilors. Therefore, all data on descriptive 
representation was collected by manually coding racial identification data (described 
below).  After identifying the appropriate year (i.e. 2015 or 2014) to draw the data from, I 
checked the current city council website. Many of the councilors who currently serve 
were also serving in 2015. Using this as a starting place, I looked at the current council, 
identified all of the councilors who served in 2015, and recorded their names and race.  
                                                
11 Found at www.usmayors.org 
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Next, I identified the councilors who had served in 2015 but were no longer in 
office. I used a two-pronged approach to find these former councilors. One tine of my 
approach was to search through archived newspapers for articles about former councilors. 
The other approach was to check Internet Archive’s “Wayback Machine”12 to see a 
cached snapshot of the council website during the study year. These two approaches 
provided the name and photos of the councilors that were not on the current city council 
website.   
After I found the names of the councilors who served in 2015, I looked for the 
racial identification of each councilor. I developed a process that mimics that of the 
voters, and is supported in the literature (e.g. A. W. Barrett & Barrington, 2005; 
Druckman, 2004). I looked at photographs of the councilors, read biographical 
information for explicitly racial cues, considered organizational membership (e.g. a 
councilor who is a member of the city’s Asian Chamber of Commerce or who leads the 
Hispanic Caucus), and perused newspaper articles for racial information. This approach 
approximates how the voter learns about candidates, and therefore how the public reads 
the racial identification of the councilors (A. W. Barrett & Barrington, 2005; Druckman, 
2004).  
After collecting the racial data on all councilors in the study, I coded the data in 
two ways. To test my theory concerning specific descriptive representation, I used three 
racial categories: Black, Latino/Hispanic, and Asian. These categories were chosen for 
                                                
12 Internet Archive is non-profit organization that, in addition to maintaining an archival resource of 
traditional media, catalogs iterations of webpages. It functions by taking snapshots of webpages, as they 
are, at different points over the years that the website exists. Find more information here: 
https://archive.org/about/faqs.php 
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two reasons: 1) streamlining the review of existing theory by conforming to current 
trends in the literature13, and 2) in accordance with methods literature, these categories 
have a sufficiently large N in the dataset for quantitative analysis (Ethridge, 2002; 
Kumar, 2011; Myers, Well, & Jr., Lorch, 2010).  
In this study, I use Asian and Latino as categories. In reality, those are both ethnic 
roll up categories – that is, they are sweeping overarching categories that encompass a 
vast, diverse set of ethnicities. Though it is common in the field to collapse these 
ethnicities into broader categories – and indeed it is necessary in a large-N study such as 
this – this process erases the important and vast differences between ethnic groups. I 
made this choice thoughtfully, aware of the tradeoffs. For a thorough discussion of 
panethnic categories, see Lopez and Espiritu (1990).  
In total, across the 116 cities initially included in the study, there were 1,028 city 
councilors. I collected racial data on each of these individuals. Across all cases, 32 of the 
city councilors were Asian, approximately 3.1%. Compare this to the national population 
of 4.8% (US Census 2010). Black councilors make up 24% of the councils, across all 
cities studied (n = 247), as compared to 13.1% of the national population. There were 111 
Latino councilors serving in 2015 across all cases, which constituted approximately 11% 
of all councilors in the study. The national Latino population is approximately 16.3%, 
according to the US Census.  
 For models that use general descriptive representation as the independent 
variable, a parallel coding process was used. Conceptually, general descriptive 
                                                
13 That is, the vast majority of literature is about Black and Latino representation and, to a lesser extent, 
Asian representation. There is a marked dearth of scholarship regarding other racial groups.   
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representation is an indicator of whether a councilor is, or is not, a racial minority. 
General descriptive representation is a binary category; councilors were coded as 
minority representatives (1) or white representatives (0). Approximately 39.5 % (407 of 
1028) of all councilors were coded as a minority representative in this study, as compared 
to 27.6% of the nation14.  
Representation in Policy -- Conceptualization and Operationalization 
My understanding of representation in policy has two distinct categories of policy.  
The first category is racial policy, and comes from Canon’s seminal book (1999). Racial 
policy explicitly names the group it seeks to affect. For example, in San Diego, CA the 
following passed policy was coded as Asian racial policy: “Authorizing a Community 
Projects, Programs, and Services funding allocation agreement to the Union of Pan Asian 
Communities for the purpose of high-risk Asian/Pacific Islander mentorship program.” 
This policy clearly names the group that it is targeting and is therefore considered racial 
policy.  
To identify racial policy, I have compiled a collection of indicator terms 
associated with racial policy (informed by Canon, see Appendix B for full list). For 
example, to identify Asian racial policy, the following words are searched for: “Asian”, 
“Asian American”, “Chinese”, “Japanese”, “Korean”, “Thai”, and “Cambodian”.  My 
                                                
14 There may be some surprise about the overrepresentation of minority councilors generally, and Black 
councilors specifically, as compared to national demographics. However, the urban-rural divide can explain 
the ostensible overrepresentation. That is, studies of population shifts, migration and settlement patterns 
have found that racial minority populations in the US are disproportionately in cities (Massey & Denton, 
1993; Wilson, 2009)Because my study focuses on US urban environments, it is not surprising that the 
councils have higher-than-average minority representation. Indeed, as compared to the average 
demographics for the cities in the study (48.46% minority, 20.72% Black) the descriptive representation of 
these groups in cities is markedly low.  
60 
 
search procedure included searching for all iterations of these root terms (e.g. not just 
searching for “Asian” but also “asian”, “Asia”, “Asian-“, etc.). To identify Black and 
Latino racial policy, I searched for a different but parallel group of words and terms. See 
Appendix B for full list of identifying terms and phrases for each racial group.  
After identifying and coding Black, Asian and Latino racial policy, I 
operationalized these groups into usable variables for the quantitative model. 
Conceptually as a variable, ‘Black racial policy’ is the amount of Black racial policy 
passed in the city in 2015, as compared to all policy passed in the city in 2015. There is 
considerable variation in the amount of policy that a council passes (ranging from 24 
policies passed by Columbus, GA to 15,982 in Cleveland, OH), and therefore a straight 
number (as opposed to a ratio) of racial policies passed would be useless. I operationalize 
racial policy as a compound variable; it is calculated by dividing the number of racial 
policies for a group by the total number of policies passed in 2015 for each city. To 
continue the above example, Columbus, GA passed one Black racial policy in 2015; 
Cleveland passed six. But as a proportion of the total policies passed, Columbus was 
actually far more representative, with 4% of all policies considered Black racial policies 
compared to .04% in Cleveland.  
The second conceptualization of policy is diversity and equity policy. Diversity 
policy is legislation that explicitly names diversity and equity goals in the text of the 
legislation. To identify diversity policy, I compiled a second collection of indicator terms. 
I compiled these terms through a review of the current literature (e.g. Fassinger, 2008; 
Ferner, Almond, & Colling, 2005). Examples of the terms include: diversity, equity, 
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inclusion, multiculturalism, pluralism, and equality. See complete list in Appendix B. 
Across all cities, approximately .4% of all policies in 2015 were related to diversity and 
equity (n=537).  
Similar to racial policy, the diversity policy variable must be operationalized as a 
proportion. Just as it was illogical to compare the number of racial policies passed, it is 
illogical to compare the number of diversity policies. Therefore, diversity policy is 
operationalized as a compound variable; it is calculated as the number of diversity and 
equity policies passed divided by the total number of policies passed in each city in 2015. 
Data Collection and Coding Processes  
To collect data on racial and diversity policies, I examined legislative records.  
All city councils keep records. However, the format of these records varies dramatically 
between cities. Approximately half of the cities in the study use an online data repository, 
such as Legistar. This software stores legislation, agendas, meeting dates and more in an 
accessible format for public records. 
I needed to identify which office maintained the legislative records to gain access, 
ask follow up questions, or find relevant links. However, the office charged with 
maintaining these records varies between cities, too. In many cities the City Clerk’s 
Office plays this role. In others, the City Secretary’s Office or the council itself maintains 
records. Identifying which office is maintains records was an important step in data 
collection, as many times I had to contact the office directly to ask for record access or 
clarification.  
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Archives vary substantially between cities; I devised a three-type approach to 
examine the records. First, I collected all legislation passed in the study year that was 
readily available (i.e. downloadable from a web-based source). I define legislation as 
ordinances, resolutions, and proclamations. Second, I issued records requests to cities that 
did not have accessible information. These requests produced mixed results; some cities 
provided exactly what I sought, whereas others were confused as to why I wanted the 
information and thus there was a delay in information sharing (e.g. New Orleans). Other 
cities, like Memphis, TN (which was eventually excluded from the study because of lack 
of data), refused to turn over archives to an out-of-state resident. 
 When the first two approaches did not work, I collected all legislative 
information that was available. This includes meeting minutes, legislative agendas, and 
voting records. All legislative information – regardless of what process I used to find it – 
made available directly by the city, not a third-party like newspapers. This ensured that 
all of the policies passed in the year, without bias, were included in the study.  
 
Data coding, cleaning, and setup 
In terms of the legislative data, the coding process focused on identifying policy 
that fit into the two policy groups: racial policy and diversity policy. Racial policy was 
broken down further, by racial group. I used the same criteria (i.e. contains the words, 
“Asian”, “Asia”, “China” etc.) that were used to conceptually identify racial policy. An 
exactly parallel procedure was used to code diversity policy. A set of terms, informed by 
the literature, was established and searched for. If the title information of a bill included 
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reference to these terms, the bill was coded as diversity policy, and pulled into its own 
dataset for further examination. The initial coding of legislation was done automatically. I 
wrote SPSS syntax (in Appendix C) to search through the titles and descriptions of the 
bills in the data set. The syntax searched through the legislation for the key terms. When 
the program found a piece of legislation that contained one of the key terms, it coded the 
bill accordingly. 
 After the initial coding process, I conducted a coding verification process. I read 
through all policies that had been coded as either racial or diversity policy, looking for 
errors in the automatic coding process. There were many policies that were initially 
collected and eventually excluded. For example, a piece of legislation about construction 
on Blackstone Road in Philadelphia was initially coded as African American racial 
policy. Clearly, it is not. The secondary coding verification process was essential to 
ensure the integrity of the database.  
Across all cities, I collected and sifted through 124,202 policies. Approximately 
.16% of all policies were Black racial policy (n=197), .15% of policies were Latino racial 
policy (n=183), and .19% of policies were Asian racial policy (n=245). Across all cities, 
.43% of the policies were related to diversity and equity (n=537).  
 
Covariates – Operationalization and Data Collection 
There are five covariates in the model: city partisan composition, strength of 
mayor, mayor party ideology, mayor race, and one minority variable. They are described 
here, as are the processes for data collection. The city partisan composition variable 
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captures the Democratic or Republican voting tendency of the city.  Individual-level 
party affiliation of councilors is not included in this analysis. Though much of the 
literature considers the importance of an individual’s party affiliation in predicting a 
councilor’s voting record (e.g. Cameron et al., 1996; Gay, 2002; Z. L. Hajnal, 2001; 
Pantoja & Segura, 2003; Preuhs, 2007; Reingold, 2000), there is strong rationale for why 
party affiliation in aggregate, as opposed to individual-level, is most appropriate for this 
study.  
First, research suggests that party affiliation is closely aligned with race, implying 
that an individual’s party affiliation is oftentimes assumed by voters by reading the race 
of the candidates (M. Htun, 2004).  Second, the majority of large US cities have non-
partisan elections (see the National League of Cities for a full discussion). In these cities, 
the party affiliation of the candidates and subsequent councilors is not known to voters, 
and does not play a role in politics. In my data set of 116 cities, only 22 have partisan 
elections. This also means that the data point is missing for 94 of the cities in my study; 
clearly the inclusion of party data for just 22 cases in the study would seriously 
jeopardize the project’s internal validity. Thus, the concept of party affiliation is 
operationalized in aggregate.  
To capture party affiliation in aggregate, I created an index variable that models 
the predictive power of party at the city level. A city’s partisan ideology or affiliation, 
captured sometimes by a measure of its conservative or liberal nature, has extensive 
predictive power in terms of what policies are passed (Z. L. Hajnal, 2001). In terms of 
operationalization, researchers have approached this in different ways. My study follows 
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the example of Reingold and Harrold (2010): city partisan composition variable that 
captures the city’s recent voting record (i.e. did the city vote Democrat or Republican in 
the last presidential election?). If a city’s partisan composition is Democrat, I expect an 
increase in representation in policy (Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2014). 
The strength of mayor variable indicates if the city has a strong or weak mayoral 
system. There is a vast body of literature on the effect of mayors, particularly on policy 
outcomes, beginning in the 1970’s with Kotter and Lawrence’s work (1974), who 
developed five approaches to being mayor mayors take to their positions. This work has 
been refined, and the typology of strong mayor versus weak mayor eventually came to 
dominate the literature (Baqir, 2002; Cheyne, 2004; Egner & Heinelt, 2008; Kjaer, 2015; 
Mouritzen & Svara, 2002). Baqir (2002), for example, writes that this duality – strong 
mayor versus weak mayor – is the most common types of mayor in the US. Additionally, 
he writes that this captures the most important variable to understanding the mayor’s role 
in policy, particularly vis-à-vis the council. Mayor-council governments are coded as 
strong mayor cities. Weak mayor cities tend to have city managers, and the mayor has a 
seat on the city council (Egner & Heinelt, 2008). Weak mayors tend to have ceremonial, 
as opposed to executive, duties (Cheyne, 2004) and tend towards a collaborative decision 
making model (Kjaer, 2015).  
The predicted effect of a strong mayor government structure is less representation 
in policy. The underpinning logic of this relationship, as presented in Morgan and 
Watson (1992), is akin to comparative political science theory about collaborative (i.e. 
parliamentary) versus adversarial (i.e. presidential) executive structures. Adversarial 
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executives exercise power over the legislature, through vetoes (or the threat thereof), 
agenda setting, and a concurrent legitimacy (Linz, 1990). The resulting relationship slows 
momentum in policy efforts (Linz, 1990; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). In parliamentary 
systems, the prime minister is chosen from the political party that has won the majority 
(or plurality) of seats in the legislature; the resulting relationship is pursuing a common 
agenda. Without an institutionalized adversary, parliamentary systems are able to pass 
more policy (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Moe & Caldwell, 1994; Strøm, 2000). 
The mayor party ideology variable indicates city partisan composition. I dummy 
coded the democratic mayor variable, so that a democratic mayor is coded as 1. I expect a 
positive relationship between democratic mayors and representation in policy, as 
suggested by the literature (Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2014).  
I collected data on the mayor’s race for each city – referred to in the model as 
mayor’s race. The operationalization of this concept is a bit complicated, though. I 
operationalize the mayor’s race as a dummy variable, indicating if the mayor is the same 
race as the group being represented. In other words, when analyzing African American 
racial policy, this indicator captures if the mayor is African American. When looking at 
diversity and equity policy, this variable indicates if the mayor is a minority. I expect the 
relationship between mayor race and representation in policy to be positive.  
Finally, there is a one minority variable. This is a dummy variable. If the value is 
one, it signals that there is a sole councilor in the category being tested. For the specific 
descriptive representation models, this means that there is only one Black, Latino or 
Asian councilor – depending on the model being tested. For the general descriptive 
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representation models, a value of one signals that there is only one minority councilor. I 
included this variable because it is an additional signal of tokenism. The size of councils 
varies considerably – from 51 councilors in New York to 4 councilors in Chula Vista, 
CA. The tokenism percentages are defined through the literature – but because there are 
such variety in the number of councilors on each council the percentages are not always 
good indicators. For example, one minority councilor in New York would constitute 
about 2% of the council; one minority councilor in Chula Vista would constitute 25%. In 
New York, this would clearly be categorized as tokenism; in Chula Vista, the percentage 
would be mis-categorized as critical mass. And clearly, the hypothesized relationships at 
tokenism versus critical mass are starkly different. To account for this, I use the one 
minority councilor variable. If there is only one councilor in the category, it automatically 
triggers tokenism, regardless of percentage.  
Data Setup 
To set up the data, I first examined it for outliers. As outlined in the literature, 
outliers were identified as data points that were either a) spurious, and/or b) more than 
two standard deviations from the mean (Ethridge, 2002; Kumar, 2011; Myers et al., 
2010). I identified one outlier: Toledo, Ohio. Toledo had much higher levels of 
representation in policy than all other cities in the dataset. 6.25% of policy passed in 2015 
was Black racial policy – a true outlier (the average amount of Black policy passed across 
all cities was .29%). Upon further inspection Toledo’s data was not directly comparable 
to the other data points in the set. The format of the data was such that the values of 
representation in policy for all categories were artificially high.  
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An additional seven cases were eliminated because of missing or unavailable data. 
Baton Rouge, for example, could not be convinced to share the data with an out of state 
resident. St. Petersburg, FL, on the other hand, maintains its records using hand written 
annotations and mark ups on scanned documents. This is impossible to search 
automatically, and because of the immense size of the records (tens of thousands of 
records) not feasible to search by hand. These cases, as well as four others, were 
eliminated. There are 116 cities with more than 200,000 residents in the US; after 
eliminating cases, 108 made up the complete study sample. The eight cities that were 
excluded from the study, listed alphabetically, are: Anaheim, CA; Arlington, TX; Baton 
Rouge, LA; Memphis, TN; St. Petersburg, FL; Tampa, FL; Toledo, OH; Virginia Beach, 
VA; Yonkers, NY. 
When creating the dataset, I used a method that took each relationship (i.e. a 
racial group as compared to its related racial policy) as its own data point. Explained in 
detail in Appendix D, the result of this process was to create a dataset that was three 
times the size of the original data. This increased the statistical power of my models and 
allowed me to test relationships that may have been too infrequent to test in the previous 
dataset construction (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). The dataset was sufficiently large 
to test most of the models that I was interested in (N=324). 
Data Analysis 
My data analysis approach consisted of two sets of quantitative tests: multiple 
regressions and a series of one-way ANOVAs. This two-pronged approach allows for a 
thorough understanding to be developed. Because ANOVA and linear regression are 
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based on similar foundations – the same assumptions about the data, the same basis of 
inquiry – they can be used in conjunction to paint a vivid picture (King, 1986).  Further, 
using ANOVA to augment linear regression models removes any constraints in the data 
(King et al., 1994), and allows for the relationship between independent and dependent 
variables to be the sole focus, without the control variables (Schrodt, 2014). As Schrodt 
(2014) points out, the inclusion of control variables can sometimes muddy the analysis of 
the primary relationship. Therefore using this two-step approach, including the controls 
in the regression analysis and removing them in the ANOVAs, allows me to more fully 
understand the relationships in question.  
First, I conducted a series of regression analyses to better understand the 
direction, strength and significance of the relationships under this study. I looked at the 
predictive power of specific descriptive representation on racial policy (Model 1) for each 
racial group. Next, I tested the predictive power of general descriptive representation on 
diversity and equity policy (Model 2). 
 
RQ1. In US cities with more than 200,000 residents, what is the relationship 
between specific descriptive representation and racial policy in 2015, holding 
relevant variables constant?  
H1: In the linear model, specific descriptive representation will not be a significant 
positive predictor of racial policy. 
H2: The best fit model will be when z (that is, the power to which descriptive 
representation is raised) is more than two, indicating that the nature of the relationship is 
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not linear (where z would be equal to 1) and not quadratic (where z would equal 2), but 
curvilinear.   
 
?             +           +            +           - 
𝑦 =   𝐵! + 𝐵!𝑥!! + 𝐵!𝑥! + 𝐵!𝑥!  + 𝐵!𝑥! +  𝐵!𝑥! +  𝐵!𝑥! +  𝜀 
 
Where  
y= racial policy 
𝑥! = percent of the council that identifies as the racial minority 
𝑥! = city has a strong mayor (dummy coded, 1=y, 0=n) 
𝑥! = district election (dummy coded, 1 = y, 0 = n) 
𝑥!= mayor is also the racial minority (dummy coded, 1=y, 0=n) 
𝑥! = city partisan ideology (dummy coded, 1 = democrat, 0 = republican) 
𝑥! = council has only one member of the race (dummy coded, 1=y, 0=n) 
The results from the analysis of this data supported my hypotheses. Where the 
literature promises a continual positive relationship, I find evidence that the relationship 
is not constant. In the linear model, contrary to suggestions from the literature, specific 
descriptive representation is not a significant predictor of racial policy (p=.226). See 
Table 3.1 below for full linear regression results.  
Table 3.1 Linear Regression Results, Racial Policy 
Racial Policy 
 Coefficient St Error 
Specific descriptive representation .364 .300 
District election -.129* .068 
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Strong mayor .165** .069 
Mayor race .101 .129 
Multiple councilors (no) .062 .130 
Democratic city -.141* .073 
N 324 
F-score 3.422 (p=.003) 
 
This finding supports Hypothesis 1. The importance of this finding, discussed 
below, cannot be overstated. A relationship that has previously been taken for granted by 
scholars finds no supported in this data.  I also find evidence that the there is a significant 
relationship between specific descriptive representation and racial policy in the cubic 
model. That is, the relationships that were hypothesized to be significant (Hypothesis 2) 
were, in fact, significant. This is the most important conclusion from this test.  
In terms of the covariates, I find interesting conclusions as well. In all models, 
three of the covariates were significant. District elections predict less racial policy; 
approximately .15% less racial policy occurred in cities that use a district election system 
(p=.033). Strong mayor cities produce approximately .17% more racial policy when 
compared with weak mayor cities (p=.014). Democratic cities predict about .14% less 
racial policy across all models (p= .061). That is, district elections, strong mayors, and 
democratic cities all have significant impacts on the amount of racial policy passed by the 
council.  
 
 
Table 3.2 Cubic Regression Results, Racial Policy 
Racial Policy 
 Coefficient St Error 
Specific descriptive representation 1.774* .938 
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Specific descriptive representation^2 -5.381* 2.9 
Specific descriptive representation^3 4.237* 2.29 
District election -.147** .129 
Strong mayor .169** .149 
Mayor race .122 .069 
Multiple councilors (no) .063 .072 
Democratic city -.136* .069 
N 324 
F-score 3.013 (p=.003) 
 
 
RQ2. In US cities with more than 200,000 residents, what is the relationship 
between general descriptive representation and diversity and equity policy in 2015, 
holding constant other relevant variables?  
H3: In the linear model, general descriptive representation will not be a significant 
positive predictor of diversity policy. 
H4: The best fit model will be when z (that is, the power to which descriptive 
representation is raised) is more than two, indicating that the nature of the relationship is 
not linear (where z would be equal to 1) and not quadratic (where z would equal 2), but 
curvilinear.   
                                ?             +           +            +           - 
𝑦 =   𝐵! + 𝐵!𝑥!! + 𝐵!𝑥! + 𝐵!𝑥!  + 𝐵!𝑥! +  𝐵!𝑥! +  𝐵!𝑥! +  𝜀 
 
Where  
y= diversity policy 
𝑥! = percent of the council that identifies as racial minority 
𝑥! = city has a strong mayor (dummy coded, 1=y, 0=n) 
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𝑥! = mayor is a democrat (dummy coded, 1=y, 0=n) 
𝑥!= mayor is a racial minority (dummy coded, 1=y, 0=n) 
𝑥! = city partisan ideology (dummy coded, 1 = democrat, 0 = republican) 
𝑥! = council has only one minority member (dummy coded, 1=y, 0=n) 
My hypotheses claim that the general descriptive representation will be a 
significant predictor of diversity policy only in the curvilinear models. General 
descriptive representation was not a significant predictor of diversity policy in any of the 
models that were tested, regardless of functional form (i.e. from linear to quartic). 
Additionally, the majority of the covariates that were suggested by the literature, were not 
significant predictors of diversity policy. The two variables that were consistently 
significant, across the models, were a) the indicators of a strong mayor system, and b) the 
Democrat mayor variable. I predicted that the strong mayor variable would have a 
negative effect on policy outcomes, but here it has consistently a positive coefficient (b = 
.003). The Democrat mayor variable aligns with hypotheses, with a consistently positive 
coefficient (b=.003), meaning that Democratic mayors predict more diversity policy. See 
Table 3.3 for full linear results; see Table 3.4 for cubic results. Additional results can be 
found in Appendix E.  
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Table 3.3 Linear Regression Results, Diversity Policy 
Diversity Policy 
 Coefficient St Error 
Specific descriptive representation -.002 .004 
District election .000 .002 
Strong mayor .003 .002 
Mayor race -.001 .002 
Multiple councilors (no) -.003 .002 
Democratic city .003 .002 
N 108 
F-score 1.061 (p=.391) 
 
 
Table 3.4 Cubic Regression Results, Diversity Policy 
Diversity Policy 
 Coefficient St Error 
Specific descriptive representation -.024 .022 
Specific descriptive representation^2 .040 .058 
Specific descriptive representation^3  -.018 .042 
District election .000 .002 
Strong mayor .003 .002 
Mayor race -.001 .002 
Multiple councilors (no) -.003 .002 
Democratic city .003 .002 
N 108 
F-score .983 (p=.454) 
 
It is my interpretation that the diversity regression models are spurious. As noted 
above, general descriptive representation was not a significant predictor of diversity 
policy, in any of its polynomial expressions. When a strong mayor was running a city, the 
model predicts .3% more diversity policy than a weak mayor city, holding all other things 
constant. Similarly, when a city is Democratic, the model predicts .3% more diversity 
policy than when a city is Republican, holding all other variables constant. The direction 
of the Democratic city indicator is aligned with theory and hypotheses. This evidence 
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seems suspect. Further research is required to determine the magnitude and direction of 
the relationship in question. As it stands, there is not evidence of a significant predictive 
relationship as hypothesized.  
 
ANOVA Explanation and Results 
To better understand the relationship between specific descriptive representation 
of African American, Latino, and Asian populations and racial policy I conducted a series 
of ANOVA tests. I considered each of the racial groups on its own. This approach 
allowed me to test the theorized cut points in the data. I used the ANOVAs to better 
understand what the tokenism period looks like for Latino representation, for example. As 
discussed above, this approach is supported by the literature in that it provides insight 
into the relationships, additional to that of regression analysis. I wanted to determine 
what kind of representation in policy could be expected in the no descriptive 
representation, tokenism, critical mass, and majority descriptive representation periods. I 
looked at these by group (i.e. African American, Latino, Asian) as it related to racial 
policy.  
 Results of an ANOVA test indicate if there is a significant difference between the 
means for different groups. The way I set up the data, the ANOCAs tested means in 
policy outcomes for different types in descriptive representation. I expect the means to be 
significantly different when the cut points are aligned correctly.   
My approach to ANOVA testing was standard, as outlined by Myers, Well and 
Lorch (2010). I set the significance level at .05. I produced both the tabular and graphic 
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results, for a visual indicator of how each model fit with my theory. To choose which cut 
points best explain the variance in the data (i.e. goodness of fit), I used the significance 
between difference, alignment with theoretical expectations, and the F-statistic.  
Specific Descriptive Representation and Racial Policy by Group 
To deep dive into each racial group separately I used ANOVAs, which use the 
same analytic framework as regressions while providing a more qualitative look at the 
data excluding the effect of covariates (King et al., 1994; Schrodt, 2014). I tested African 
American representation and Latino representation. There was not significant variance in 
the amount of Asian descriptive representation to perform an ANOVA15 (King et al., 
1994). The results from African American and Latino tests are presented in tabular, 
graphic, and descriptive form and interpreted below.  The binned data showed a 
significant difference in the mean racial policy passed at different intervals of descriptive 
representation. The models support my hypotheses of a curvilinear hypothesized 
relationship. I ran six different configurations of ANOVAs. Of the six models tested, 
three sets of results were both statistically significant and theoretically hypothesized. 
Results of the best-fit model (determined by looking at the F-score) are presented below. 
Full results can be found in Appendix F.  
 
 
                                                
15 The variation around the independent variable (i.e. specific descriptive representation) was so little that 
there was not much variance to analyze. For example, 90 of the 107 cities included in the study had no 
Asian councilors at all. This extreme lack of diversity in the data points means that any analysis on just the 
Asian population would be difficult to interpret as compared to the black or Latino populations. Asian data 
was included in the overarching analyses. 
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Table 3.5 ANOVA results, African American Descriptive Representation and Racial 
Policy 
Category Cut points Mean Racial Policy 
No Descriptive Rep  x = 0 .136 (N = 35) 
Tokenism x <= .25 OR only 1 
Black councilor 
.257 (N = 37) 
Critical mass  .25< x <= .50 .586 (N = 28) 
Majority descriptive 
representation  
.50<= x .139 (N = 8) 
F-score 1.725(p=.166)  
 
Figure 3.1 Plot of ANOVA results, African American Descriptive Representation 
and Racial Policy 
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The model presented above is approaching significance (p=.116). The shape of 
the plot, Figure 3.1, aligns perfectly with my theoretical model. There is a distinct peak in 
the amount of racial policy passed in the critical mass period – as I argued. And there is 
an equally distinct drop off in the amount of racial policy passed in the Majority 
descriptive representation period. This supports my claim that councilors focus on 
passing other types of policies in periods of majority descriptive representation.   
The ANOVA tests of the Latino data produced markedly different results. First, 
the results were significant (p=.018) indicating a significant difference between group 
means. Second, the shape of the data was different from my theoretical model, and from 
the results from the African American ANOVA. See results below.  
Table 3.6 ANOVA results, Latino Descriptive Representation and Racial Policy 
Category Cut points Mean Racial Policy 
No Descriptive Rep  x = 0 .113 (N=55) 
Tokenism x <= .25 AND only 1 
Latino councilor 
.231 (N=38) 
Critical mass  .25< x <= .50 .312 (N=10) 
Majority descriptive 
representation  
.50<= x .638 (N = 5) 
F-score 3.149 (p=.028)  
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Figure 3.2 Plot of ANOVA results, Latino Descriptive Representation and Racial 
Policy 
 
The data supports my argument that there are significant differences in racial policy 
output based on the level of descriptive representation. However, the direction of these 
differences runs contrary to my argument. There is a nearly-constant rate of increase in 
racial policy as descriptive representation increases in the first three stages. When we 
enter the stage of Majority descriptive representation, I expected to see a sharp decrease 
in racial policy. Instead there is a drastic increase in the amount of racial policy passed 
General Descriptive Representation and Diversity Policy 
Like the results from the regression analysis of this relationship, the ANOVA 
results were not significant. The model that is approaching significance is shown below. 
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The p-value associated with this test suggests that there is not a significant different 
between the means of the types of general descriptive representation. Further, the plot of 
these results is contrary to the hypotheses presented earlier in the chapter.  
 
Table 3.7 ANOVA Results, General Descriptive Representation and Diversity Policy 
Category Cut points Mean 
No minority councilors  x = 0 .797 (N=12) 
Tokenism1  1 minority councilor .228 (N=12) 
Tokenism2 x <=.30 AND more than 
one minority councilor 
.793 (N=23) 
Critical mass  .30< x <= .50 .418 (N=37) 
Majority descriptive 
representation  
.50<= x .624 (N = 24) 
F-score 1.547 (p=.194)  
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Figure 3.3 Plot of ANOVA Results, General Descriptive Representation and 
Diversity Policy 
 
 
 
Validity 
In accordance with the literature (Ethridge, 2002; Myers et al., 2010) this project 
has internal validity. The components of the project are logically linked. The racial 
composition of a council affects the dynamics of the group, thus affecting which policies 
are proposed and championed, and by whom. Additionally, the racial composition of the 
council affects the perceptions of the constituency, altering the electoral math and 
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strategy pursued by councilors. This intuitive link lends credibility to the internal validity 
of my project.  
Conclusion 
 To test my theory and hypotheses, I devised two strategies. These approaches are 
outlined in this chapter. In this chapter, I first restated the research questions and 
hypotheses, including hypothesized effects of covariates. In the second section, I discuss 
the research design and the operationalization of all variables included in the study. Then 
I describe my data collection process. Next, I discussed how I use two main methods for 
testing my hypotheses: regression analysis and ANOVA testing. I explain my rationale 
for these choices, and then described how I conduct these tests. I then presented my 
findings, highlighting which results supported, and which detracted from, hypothesized 
results. Finally, I conclude the chapter by discussing challenges to validity and reliability.  
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CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDIES  
 
“There is much to be gained from recognizing the deep epistemological 
differences between qualitative and quantitative approaches to the pursuit of knowledge” 
(D. L. Morgan, 1998, p. 363). A mixed methods approach allows for the inclusion of 
these epistemological differences in a real, robust way. The combination of these 
methods means that the author can make broad generalizations about the nature of the 
relationship in question, while simultaneously making deep inquiries about the 
mechanisms at work in particular cases.  
 Armed with the assurance that qualitative research provides a different kind of 
insight and understanding than quantitative, I began a qualitative venture. I conducted 
four case studies, focusing on liberal cities with similar institutions in different regions of 
the US. The results highlight that there are differing rationales at play in different levels 
of descriptive representation. That is, by conducting a qualitative, subset analysis, I was 
able to better understand and illustrate the political posturing and positioning that is going 
on at the ground level.  
 Case selection is paramount for a successful set of case studies; my description of 
the case selection process is the first section below. The second section focuses on the 
qualitative methods I used. I describe my process for understanding each case and how I 
replicated the data gathering for each case. I then present the case studies, beginning with 
Diversity Policy in Portland, OR, then moving to Asian Racial Policy in Minneapolis, 
Diversity Policy in Albuquerque, and finally Black Racial Policy in New Orleans. I 
conclude the chapter by bringing these case studies together and looking at the entire 
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picture. The thesis that emerges from this exercise is that there is qualitative support for 
my theories, and that the curvilinear relationship described in previous chapters can be 
observed in these case studies. 
 
Case Selection 
 Case selection is the foundation for case study. As described by Gerring (2008), I 
used the ‘typical method’ of selection, coupled with the ‘diverse method.’ That is, I 
sought cases with key similarities (in this case, population values and city partisanship), 
as well as essential differences (regional and demographic). This hybrid technique allows 
for the most compelling, complete picture of the qualitative data.  
 The four cities included as case studies are (listed alphabetically): Albuquerque, 
NM; Minneapolis, MN: New Orleans, LA; and Portland, OR. All cities are mid-sized, 
with populations ranging from nearly 400,000 (New Orleans’ population is 
approximately 390,000) to around 600,000 (Portland’s population is approximately 
630,000). In addition to similar population sizes, all four cities are politically liberal. All 
voted Democratic in the last presidential election, and all are run by a Democratic (or non 
partisan) mayor. The liberal political views indicate that the city is more open to passing 
representative policy (Abrajano & Hajnal, 2015; Z. L. Hajnal, 2001). By using only 
liberal cities, I am in effect holding this variable constant so that I can focus on the effect 
of descriptive representation on policy outcomes.  
Another commonality between these cities is found in the mayor: all mayors in 
these cities are white. Regardless of the demographics of the city, or of the council, all 
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four of these cities elected a white mayor. The race of the mayor is an important variable, 
as suggested by Bobo and Gilliam (1990). Cities with descriptively representative mayors 
are more likely to have more representation in policy. Thus, choosing cities with white 
mayors I eliminate the variation in the cases due to the race of the mayor.  
 In addition to the typical variables (i.e. the things that the cases have in common), 
I used one major difference: racial demographics of the city. Portland is the whitest major 
city in the country (Semuels, 2016) whereas Albuquerque has a very large Latino 
population (approximately 42%). Minneapolis has one of the largest refugee population 
from Somalia in the US (Shah, 2017) and New Orleans is a touchstone for African 
American culture. A city’s demographic information is closely linked with its descriptive 
representation on the council. In fact, it is so closely linked that when I tested a previous 
iteration of the quantitative model, including both demographic and descriptive 
representation variables, it violated the assumption of no multicollinearity. I held relevant 
variables constant, while choosing cases with sufficient variation in the independent 
variable.  
 Using the methods identified in the field, I developed a case selection strategy that 
was appropriate to the research question. I used the typical and diverse methods of 
selection, and found four cases that were ideal for examination. The cities had important 
elements in common: they are all mid-sized, liberal cities led by a white mayor. The 
cities also differed in one important way: racial demographics. The similarities between 
these cities coupled with the stark difference means that the case study portion of my 
dissertation is compelling. 
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Methods  
 In this section, I discuss how I explored each case and used it to better understand 
the key relationships in question, as well as the results presented in the previous chapter.  
This section also serves as a makeshift chapter outline; as I describe the methods that I 
used to better understand each case, I am simultaneously describing a section in each case 
study. 
 I first gathered background information on each case. This included relevant 
details about the councilors, like who they were and their racial identification. I identified 
the mayor and their race. I gathered information on structural and institutional variables, 
such as electoral system and form of council. I then gathered information about the 
demographics of the city. I considered the political landscape of each case, gathering 
information about the on-the-ground political context of the city in 2015. This 
information helped inform my understanding of the bills.  
I then gathered information on the legislative output for the city in the study year. 
I found the number of bills that each city passed, and the number of bills that would be 
considered representation in policy. Finally, I learned more about the decision-making 
context, relying heavily on newspaper particles to add richness to my understanding of 
the cases. 
 After gathering background information, I dove into a deeper understanding of the 
legislative material. I identified the text and the name of the bills that had been 
categorized as representation in policy. I summarized the bills to better understand them, 
putting the text into my own words to gauge their effect. After identifying and marinating 
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in the language of the bills, I reviewed the vote count for each. I was looking for 
additional insight; was a representative bill passed unanimously? Was it contentious, and 
thus passed by a narrow margin? I answered these questions, all the while checking in to 
see how what I was learning was measuring up to my theoretical hypotheses.    
 Then, after exploring these important elements, I did a final reckoning. I asked 
how well the case fit with my theory. I asked what additional can be learned from the 
case, what wrinkle it provides in terms of the theory. I asked what nuance could be 
gleaned, and then applied to my understanding of the quantitative results. The thesis that 
emerges from these case studies is that they tend to fit with the hypotheses. They provide 
compelling and interesting support for the findings presented in the previous chapter. 
  Finally, after considering each case separately, I brought them together. 
Considered in concert, even as anecdotal evidence, they are compelling. When the data 
points are considered as a whole, they show a marked curvilinear relationship that aligns 
with the theoretical predictions of Chapter 2.  
Case study – Diversity Policy in Portland, OR 
 
“There is a growing awareness that we have many different 
communities of new Portlanders, including refugee and immigrant 
communities”  -- Amanda Fritz, a white Portland City Commissioner, 
as she advocates for a new City Commission for Immigrants and 
Refugees, actively positioning herself as representative of racial 
minority groups (Mulligan, 2016).   
 
 
 In Portland, I find an example of the effect of no general descriptive 
representation on diversity policy. It is a primarily white, liberal city that has a history of 
both rallying for civil rights, and latent white supremacy (Semuels, 2016). With its all 
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white council, my theory suggests that I would find higher-than-average diversity policy 
outcomes. Theoretically, councilors should act in a representative way, posturing and 
performing as conduits of racial minority policy preferences so as to preclude the need 
for a descriptively representative councilor. In this case study I find support for my 
hypothesis. I find that, numerically, the city has a fairly high level of representation in 
policy. I also find anecdotal evidence that Portland commissioners actively posture as 
representatives of minority interests, effectively negating a constituent need for 
descriptive representation.  
Background 
 
Portland in 2015 was preoccupied with the Democratic primary candidacy of 
Bernie Sanders (Mapes, 2015). Oregon’s primaries are late in the primary cycle, coming 
well after New Hampshire and Iowa set the political tone for the country. In 2015, by the 
time the Democratic primaries had reached Portland, it was clear that Hillary Clinton was 
going to win the nomination. Despite this – or perhaps because of it – Sanders’ support in 
Portland was undiminished.  
Also at play in 2015 was the litigation between the Department of Justice and 
Portland Police Bureau. In 2015, the DOJ was investigating the PPB’s use of force 
against people with mental disabilities16 (e.g. “America’s Cities Mirror Baltimore’s 
Woes,” 2015; Harris-Perry & Seltz-Wald, 2015). The DOJ investigation paid particular 
attention to police brutality against people of color. This lawsuit was widely discussed in 
                                                
16 In addition the DOJ investigation, in 2015 the PPB launched a research project with consultants to 
develop a Strategic Equity Plan and a Strategic Equity Evaluation Plan.  Portland State’s Center for Public 
Service was hired to develop the latter plan, and I was one of the lead researchers on this project. 
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Portland and received significant attention from the community (Bernstein, 2015).  "This 
agreement, now affirmed, solidifies Portland's commitment to serving our diverse 
community. ... We're serious about having a police force that appreciates the issues 
around mental illness and that utilizes de-escalation tactics”, said Portland Mayor (and 
Councilmember) Charlie Hales (Green, 2014). 
In terms of the institutional variables in my model, Portland had the following 
elements in 2015. There were five city council members (called “commissioners”; 
Portland has one of the last remaining commission forms of government in a major US 
city17). They were: Nick Fish, Amanda Fritz, Dan Saltzman and Steve Novick. The fifth 
commissioner was Mayor Charlie Hales. In Portland, there is a weak mayor. 
Approximately 76.1% of Portland in 2010 was white – making it one of the whitest major 
cities in the US (Semuels, 2016). 6.3% of the city was Black and 7.1% of the city 
identified as Asian. 9.4% of the population was Latino (including those who identified as 
white as well).  
The bills 
 
The Portland City Council passed 157 policies in 2015. Of those, two were about 
diversity and equity programs (i.e. 1.27%). The average amount of diversity and equity 
policy passed across all cities in 2015 was .564 %. In other words, Portland passed 
approximately twice as much diversity and equity policy that the sample average in the 
study year – with no general descriptive representation on the council.  
                                                
17 https://www.portlandoregon.gov/Auditor/article/9178 
90 
 
 The first policy passed was Council Ordinance 18703018. This policy is about 
increasing the amount of equity in contracting in the city. It explicitly aims to increase the 
amount of women and minority owned businesses that are contractual partners. Clearly 
this bill fits in the diversity and equity policy category. It increases diversity in the city’s 
contractual partners and explicitly states this as a goal. This is part of a long tradition 
beginning in the 1960’s to encourage diversity within the companies who partner with 
government. The ultimate goal is to support women and minority owned businesses (E. J. 
Barrett, 1995; Porter, 1995).  
The second policy that the Council passed was Council Ordinance 18695019. This 
policy amends a previous contract, and is focused on cultural services in the city. Though 
the text of the previous contract is not included in this bill – and is therefore not part of 
this case study – its subject is considered diversity and equity. That is, the bill is 
providing cultural services to city residents.  
Both diversity and equity bills passed with unanimous support. These policies 
constitute a relatively large percent of the entire slate of policies that was passed by the 
Portland commission. The average across cases is .564%, and it is more than double in 
Portland (1.27%). Previous literature would point to the dearth of descriptive 
representation and hypothesize that this would result in a dearth in policy output as well 
(e.g. Dahlerup, 1988; Kanter, 1977; Mansbridge, 1999). I argue, however, that in order to 
                                                
18 The title of which is: CITY AUDITOR - CITY RECORDER - COUNCIL ORDINANCE - 187030 
ESTABLISH THE COMMISSION ON EQUITABLE CONTRACTING AND PURCHASING TO 
INCREASE UTILIZATION OF MINORITIES AND WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESSES ORDINANCE 
19 The title of which is: “CITY AUDITOR - CITY RECORDER - COUNCIL ORDINANCE - 186950 
REGIONAL ARTS AND CULTURE COUNCIL PUBLIC ART MATTERS AMEND CONTRACT 
30001790 ORDINANCE” 
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prevent a descriptively representative challenger, councilors support s minimum level of 
representation in policy. By positioning themselves as allies, white councilors hope to 
preempt the need for a descriptively representative challenger.  
   
How this fits with my theory 
 
The quote from Commissioner Fritz at the top of this case study suggests that 
there is political posturing by the commissioners. It shows an understanding of her 
vulnerability as a member of an all-white council. She acknowledges that there is a need 
for representation of racial minority groups. Commissioner Fritz could discuss a need for 
descriptive representation, or use her position to augment the work of community leaders. 
Instead she is putting herself in the middle of the conversation, claiming to represent the 
needs of racial minority groups in the city.   
 The posturing of Commissioner Fritz included, Portland is a strong example of 
my theory. It has an all-white council and mid-level diversity and equity policy in 2015. 
This signals that though other scholars have credited representation in policy to the effect 
of descriptive representation, there is something else afoot. The lack of general 
descriptive representation was not a barrier for passing 1.27% of representative policy – 
more than double the average across cases. See figures below.  
 
Figure 4.1 Illustration of Portland's General Descriptive Representation 
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Figure 4.2 General Descriptive Representation in Policy, Portland as Compared to 
the National Average 
 
 
 
 
The unanimous support for these bills, too, implies that the all-white council was 
not a significant barrier. Though this finding contradicts previous scholarship, it aligns 
with my theory. I argue that councilors in an all-white council will work to stave off a 
racially representative councilor and thus will act so as to appear representative. The 
amount of policy here, considered with the unanimous support and the decision-making 
context, signals that mid-level policy outcomes are to be expected.  
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Case study – Asian Racial Policy in Minneapolis, MN 
 
“ ‘Certain people, they feel like they want to call people names,” Yang 
said. “ ‘You’re not progressive enough,’ ‘You’re not liberal enough’… 
‘You don’t care about this … group of people.’ My job is to do 
everything I can to help my constituents in Ward Five. My other job is to 
figure out what’s best for the city of Minneapolis. I take those two things 
very seriously.” – Councilor Blong Yang, the first Hmong American 
councilor of Minneapolis. In this interview, he is addressing the criticism 
that he was not doing enough to represent Asian groups in Minneapolis 
(Golden, 2016). In this quote, Councilor Yang illustrates balancing the 
needs of the represented group with the fears of white backlash and 
maintaining the status quo.  
 
 
In Minneapolis in 2015, there was one Asian member of the Council. Councilor 
Blong Yang was a strong representative of his descriptive group; he brought 20 Hmong 
children to tour city buildings (Clark, 2014), he frequently discussed his ties to the racial 
community, and advocated for Asian immigrants that did not speak English (Clark, 2013) 
That is, he was a great descriptive representative. He was not, however, a strong 
representative in policy. Councilor Yang and the rest of the Council passed exactly zero 
Asian racial policies in 2015. In Minneapolis, I find an excellent example of tokenism at 
work.  
 
Background 
In 2015, Minneapolis had one of the most important BLM movements in the 
country (Dalton, 2015). Its ties to the national organization were mirrored at home; the 
Minneapolis police department was accused of disproportionate use of force against 
people of color (Miller, 2015). The city was also in the middle of a political and racial 
94 
 
moment, looking closely at how identity politics and political movements overlapped 
(Hausman, 2015; Karnowski, 2015; “LGBTQ Organizations Stand in Solidarity with 
Black Lives Matter,” 2015; McClatchy, 2015). In addition to the momentum of BLM, 
general conversations about rising inequality in the city were prevalent both in general 
terms (Dehn, 2015; Rosen, Green, Zhou, Semuels, & Pinsker, 2015), and specifically 
about jobs growth (Salisbury, 2015) and minimum wage (Hedges, 2015). 
Politicians in Minneapolis had to walk a fine line, catering to the political moment 
while maintaining their electoral base. For one councilor in particular, this was difficult. 
In 2015, Councilor Yang was midway through his term as the elected councilor from 
Ward 5. As illustrated by the quote at the top of this case study, his role had an inherently 
difficult duality. As I argue all Token representatives experience, Yang had to balance the 
needs of the racial minority group with the needs of the rest of his constituency. And, he 
had to do this in a way that protected his electoral power.  
Minneapolis is a liberal, northern city with a population of approximately 410,000 
people. In 2015, its mayor was a white woman, Betsy Hodges of the Democratic Farmer 
Labor (DFL) Party, a socially liberal party in the region. Minneapolis has a strong mayor 
system, and uses a district electoral system. In addition, Minneapolis happens to be an 
excellent example of tokenism when considering Asian descriptive representation and 
related racial policy. The Minneapolis city council has 13 members. Yang was the only 
Asian councilor to serve that year, making up approximately 8% of the council – making 
a clear case of tokenism. Of the remaining twelve councilors, ten were white, one was 
Black and one was Latino.  
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Bills 
In 2015, a total of 519 policies were passed by the Minneapolis city council. None 
of these policies were Asian specific. One might then ask, was there any racial policy for 
any group? Perhaps the Minneapolis council does not deal with this type of policy; 
maybe this isn’t in the city’s ethos? I looked at the other categories of policy to check. In 
2015, there was one Black specific policy, one Latino specific policy and two diversity 
and equity policies – indicating that the council is open to racial and diversity policies 
and, simultaneously, passed no specific Asian policy. Across cases, cities passed an 
average of .209% Asian policy.  
 
How this fits with my theory 
The lack of Asian representation in policy, despite the presence of Councilor 
Yang, aligns well with my theory. I argue that there is considerable white backlash in the 
tokenism period. I argue that token councilors are unable to pass a racial policy agenda on 
their own, and that they will not have the support of their white counterparts. Thus, 
despite the presence of a representative, the represented group can expect very little 
policy. Kanthak and Krause (2012) predict similar outcomes. There is no chance of a 
race-based coalition for the represented minority, making it impossible to pass 
representative policy without the support of white councilors. The likelihood of white 
backlash in the tokenism period is high, however, and thus it is equally unlikely that the 
white counterparts on the council will rally with the Token representative to pass a slate 
of representative policies.  
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Figure 4.3 Illustration of Minneapolis' Asian Descriptive Representation 
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Figure 4.4 Asian Representation in Policy, Minneapolis as Compared to National 
Average 
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Case Study – Diversity Policy in Albuquerque   
 
“City Council President Rey Garduño—with guidance and input from The 
Red Nation and community organizations—wrote, sponsored, and proposed 
the initiative. Six councilors endorsed and three abstained. Those who 
endorsed included Garduño, Ken Sanchez, Klarissa Peña, Isaac Benton, 
Brad Winter, and Diane Gibson. Those against included Dan Lewis, Trudy 
Jones, and Don Harris.” – An article published in The Red Nation, a Native 
American publication in Albuquerque. This quote illustrates an allegiance 
between the minority members of the council, acting to enhance diversity 
and equity initiatives in the city, despite the opposition of white councilors.  
 
Albuquerque illustrates the effect of critical mass on diversity policy. I 
hypothesize that during a critical mass type, a group will experience very high levels of 
representation in policy, because they have the legislative power and stability to pursue a 
policy agenda without fear of white backlash (on the part of the voters, or the other 
council members), and without needing to have internal differentiation (as with majority 
descriptive representation). Based on the number of policies passed and the number of 
representatives on the council, I would argue that Albuquerque represents the effect of 
critical mass well. The above quote illustrates how minority councilors were able to act 
together to pursue a strong, diversity-based policy agenda. 
 
Background 
Susana Martinez was the first Latina governor in the country and was elected as 
governor of New Mexico in 2011. She framed herself as a staunch “compassionate 
conservative” Republican in a Democratic state (Nordlinger, 2014, p. 2). Her policies 
were markedly conservative; she was against amnesty for undocumented immigrants, in 
favor of increased border restrictions, and tried to convince the New Mexico legislature 
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to repeal a bill allowing undocumented immigrants access to driver’s licenses. Despite 
her conservative immigration stance, however, she was favored by the Latino community 
and attracted the support of many staunch Democrats. Her political opponent (a white 
male Democrat) argued that she did not possess a “Latino heart” (Nordlinger, 2014, p. 2). 
Exit polls and subsequent support indicated that the Latino community disagreed. New 
Mexico had its first Latina governor and a new era of descriptive representation at the 
executive level emerged.  
In early August of 2014, Ferguson, MO captured national attention with the police 
shooting of the unarmed Black man, Michael Brown. The subsequent focus on racial bias 
and racially based violence on the part of police spanned cities across the country. In 
201420, Albuquerque was embroiled in a related controversy. There were allegations of 
systematic racial biases in the police department, and cases of extreme use of force by the 
bureau. These police actions were subject to national scrutiny (Davies et al., 2014; 
Golden & Jany, 2015; Melber et al., 2014; Sharpe, 2014). As Sharpe writes, Hispanic 
residents of Albuquerque were the ones who were targeted by the overzealous police 
force. Following the allegations of racially based police violence, Eric Holder promised 
to investigate (Jones, 2014).  
In 2014 there were nine city council members. They were (listed in order of the 
Districts that the represent):  Ken Sanchez, Isaac Benton, Klarissa Peña, Brad Winter, 
Dan Lewis, Rey Garduño, Diane Gibson, Trudy Jones, and Don Harris.  In Albuquerque, 
there is a strong mayor system; Mayor Richard Berry had both executive power and veto 
power.  
                                                
20 The study year, as a large portion of the council changed in 2015. 
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 There were three minority members of the council in 2014 (Ken Sanchez, 
Klarissa Peña, and Rey Garduño), making up approximately one-third of the council – 
and signaling critical mass. In Albuquerque in 2010, the city demographics were as 
follows. Approximately 42.1% of the population was white. 3.3% of the city was Black 
and 2.6% of the city identified as Asian. 46.7% of the population was Latino. Together, 
that means that more than half of the city identifies as a racial minority (52.6%). 
The bills 
The Albuquerque city council passed 160 policies in 2014. Of those, six were 
about diversity and equity programs (i.e. 3.75%). The average amount of diversity and 
equity policy passed across all cities was .564%. In other words, Albuquerque passed 
nearly six times more diversity and equity policy that the sample average in the study 
year. This very high amount of diversity and equity policy was passed with the critical 
mass level of descriptive representation.  
Of the six bills that the council passed that pertained to diversity and equity, two 
were proposed by minority councilors. Councilor Peña introduced a bill that appropriated 
funds to the Hispanic Cultural Center Foundation21,. This bill promotes diversity and 
multiculturalism in its title and thus was double categorized as both a diversity and equity 
policy and a Latino racial policy. Councilor Sanchez also introduced a bill about equity 
and diversity22. This legislation appropriates funds to the Cultural Services Department; it 
                                                
21 The title of which is: “APPROPRIATING LODGERS’ TAX FUNDS TO THE NATIONAL HISPANIC 
CULTURAL CENTER FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVERTISING, PUBLICIZING AND PROMOTION 
OF THE NATIONAL HISPANIC CULTURAL CENTER (PEÑA)” 
22 The title of which is “APPROVING AND AUTHORIZING THE ACCEPTANCE OF GRANT FUNDS 
FROM THE NEW MEXICO STATE LIBRARY FOR THE BASIC STATE GRANTS IN AID AND 
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is considered a diversity and equity policy as it serves to enhance the cultural offerings of 
Albuquerque.  
Councilor Harris introduced the third diversity bill23. This bill is ceremonial, 
recognizing the significance of a local community center’s contributions to the city’s 
culture. The fourth bill was proposed by Councilor Jones, and is another bill about 
receiving funds from the national government for the Cultural Services Department24. 
Though this does not name equity and diversity explicitly, the bill furthers diversity in 
cultural recognition. The fifth bill has the same title as the fourth bill, but was proposed 
by Councilor Benton25. The method that the Albuquerque City Council uses to track its 
legislation means that it is difficult to tell if this is a unique bill, or a reframing of the 
previous. Nevertheless, it passed as a piece of singular legislation and thus was counted. 
In all three of these bills, Albuquerque is clearly investing in building its cultural 
repertoire, and has received numerous grants from federal agencies to do so. It is also 
recognizing those in the field who are augmenting these goals. These kinds of bill reflect 
the city’s commitment to the promotion of diverse culture. 
                                                                                                                                            
PROVIDING FOR AN APPROPRIATION TO THE CULTURAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT IN 
FISCAL YEAR 2014 (SANCHEZ)”. 
23 The title of which is, ““RECOGNIZING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HISTORIC SITE ADJACENT 
TO THE SINGING ARROW COMMUNITY CENTER, KNOWN AS RANCHO DE CARNUÉ, IN 
ORDER TO RECOGNIZE AND PRESERVE THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SITE, AND DESIGNATE IT WORTHY OF ADDITIONAL 
ARCHAEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS, PRESERVATION, AND INTERPRETATION; MAKING 
AN APPROPRIATION TO THE OPEN SPACE DIVISION OF THE PARKS AND RECREATION 
DEPARTMENT (HARRIS)”. 
24 “APPROVING AND AUTHORIZING ACCEPTANCE OF A LETTER OF AWARD FROM THE 
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS (NEA) AND MAKING AN APPROPRIATION TO THE 
CULTURAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT IN FISCAL YEAR 2015 (JONES, BY REQUEST)” 
25 “APPROVING AND AUTHORIZING ACCEPTANCE OF A LETTER OF AWARD FROM THE 
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS (NEA) AND MAKING AN APPROPRIATION TO THE 
CULTURAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT IN FISCAL YEAR 2014 (BENTON, BY REQUEST)” 
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 Finally, the sixth bill, proposed by Councilor Benton, sought explicitly to increase 
equitable access to a government service for city residents – in terms of transportation26. 
It allocates funding for bike infrastructure, with the named goal of increasing equity in 
access to city services. The bill was all about enhancing access to city amenities for 
underserved groups. It is clearly an equity bill.  
   
 
 
 
How this fits with my theory 
In Albuquerque, there is a critical mass level of general descriptive representation 
– between 30 and 50%. And the related policy outcomes are very high – almost 6.7 times 
the average across cases. This data, when considered through the lens of the literature and 
my theory, implies that the minority members of the committee are able to pass beneficial 
policy in large amounts, without the fear of white backlash from other members of the 
council. Further, the council had not yet reached the majority descriptive representation 
period (i.e. over 50%) – and thus there was no need for inter-group differentiation. 
Minority councilors could pursue a slate of diversity policies and enjoy political and 
electoral success.  
                                                
26  “AUTHORIZING THE MAYOR TO EXECUTE A GRANT AGREEMENT WITH THE NEW 
MEXICO STATE HIGHWAY AND TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT FOR SAFE, 
ACCOUNTABLE, FLEXIBLE, EFFICIENT, TRANSPORTATION EQUITY ACT: A LEGACY FOR 
USERS (SAFETEA-LU) FUNDING TO OPERATE A BICYCLE SAFETY EDUCATION PROGRAM 
IN OUTDOOR RECREATION AND PROVIDING AN APPROPRIATION TO THE PARKS AND 
RECREATION DEPARTMENT (BENTON)” 
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Figure 4.5 Illustration of Albuquerque's General Descriptive Representation 
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Figure 4.6 General Representation in Policy, Albuquerque as Compared to National 
Average 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study – Black Racial Policy in New Orleans, LA 
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American Councilor LaToya Cantrell, promoting business interests 
while talking about a proposed policy change (M. P. Welch, 2015).  
 
 
 
“As Chair of the Committee on Public Works, Sanitation, and 
Environment, I welcome this settlement as a commitment to rebuild the 
damage that has negatively impacted the City's economy.” – African 
American Councilor Nadine Ramsey, actively committing to the economic 
progress of the city (“CITY UNVIELS RESILIENCE STRATEGY,” 2015). 
 
 
 
In terms of Black racial, New Orleans is a prime example of majority descriptive 
representation. In Chapter 2, I argued that because of the need for internal differentiation, 
when there is Majority descriptive representation, there would be relatively low policy 
outputs. Councilors would need to distinguish and differentiate themselves from other 
descriptively representative councilors, and thus would pursue a policy agenda that is 
aligned with another interest group. That is, councilors will cultivate an issue-oriented 
identity so as to attract voters. This will lead to high levels of descriptive representation 
predicting low levels of representation in policy. Illustratively, New Orleans has very, 
very high levels of Black descriptive representation and lower-than-average Black 
representation in policy.  
 
Background 
 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall in 2005 – its ramifications were still being felt in 
2015. The disproportionate impacts of Katrina, and the subsequent government response, 
on racial minorities in the city (e.g. August et al., 2015; Kimmett, 2015; Workneh, 2015). 
Scholarship has argued that Hurricane Katrina served as an exposer of truth in the city, 
104 
 
that the hurricane called attention to the preexisting structural discrimination and racism 
that was largely being ignored (Thompson, 2009). Katrina brought it to light, exposing a 
city with vast racial tensions and dramatic racial political landscapes.  
Because of physical damage, and then because of population shifts, the school system 
was left decimated by Katrina. Local government undertook a bold experiment: a public 
system that was made up completely of charter schools (e.g. Kimmett, 2015; Wong, 
Green, & Zhou, 2015). In 2015, considerable attention was paid to how well the public 
school system was faring ten years on. The results were mixed and many called for 
additional funding and evaluation of the programs.  
The city was intro- and retrospective in 2015, focusing on the lasting implications of 
Katrina, including on specific policy matters. They focused on how Black residents were 
continuing to experience setbacks. Further, the national fervor about BLM and the 2016 
presidential campaign were influencing New Orleans in a real way, affecting the local 
political conversation. Finally, the city was experiencing a local race-based scandal – 
with the city’s white mayor as the focus. All of these elements together would suggest 
that a savvy council might pursue a more sensitive policy agenda – lobbying for more 
racial Black policy to offset some of the apparent tensions. Instead, as my research finds, 
there is a noticeable paucity of racial Black policy. This is counterintuitive, and serves to 
support of my theory.  
New Orleans, LA is a liberal, mid-sized city, with a white mayor, in the South. In 
2015, there were seven city council members: Stacy Head, Jason Rogers Williams, Susan 
G. Guidry, LaToya Cantrell, Nadine M. Ramsey, Jared C. Brossett, and James Austin 
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Gray II. There is a strong mayor system; Mayor Mitchell Joseph Landrieu was elected in 
2010 and was serving in 2015.  New Orleans uses a mixed electoral system, with two 
representatives serving at-large (Councilors Head and Williams), and the remaining five 
representing geographically defined districts in the city.  
 In 2015, four of the seven (i.e. approximately 57%) councilors were Black: 
Councilors Williams, Cantrell, Ramsey, and Gray. The remaining three councilors (i.e. 
43%) were white: Councilors Head, Guidry, and Brossett. A council with more than 50% 
descriptive representation is considered in the majority descriptive representation type. In 
New Orleans in 2010, the city demographics were as follows: 59.8% of the city was 
Black, 30.5% was white, 4.9% was Latino, and 3% was Asian.   
The bills 
There were 2,320 policies passed in New Orleans in 2015. Of these policies, only two 
were categorized as Black policy (approximately .09%). The average amount of Black 
policy across cases was .29%. In other words, far fewer policies were passed in New 
Orleans than the average across cities in this study. This is despite the high levels of 
Black descriptive representation on the council. Brief descriptions of these policies are 
reproduced below, as well as a summarization of why they are considered Black 
representation in policy.  
 The first policy’s description is Ordinance 2649027. This ordinance waives fees so 
as to aid an event called the Black Men of Labor. This ordinance clearly relates to Black 
                                                
27 The title of which is, AN ORDINANCE TO TEMPORARILY WAIVE CERTAIN FEES, PERMIT 
FEES, AND REQUIREMENTS WITHIN AND AROUND THE TREME RECREATION COMMUNITY 
CENTER LOCATED IN THE 900 BLOCK OF NORTH VILLERE STREET, NEW ORLEANS, 
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representation. Further research on the Black Men of Labor produced the organization’s 
mission statement is: “To educate, preserve, and perpetuate our rich African & African-
American Culture by creating sustainable economic opportunities that break the cycle of 
generational poverty in New Orleans” (“Our Mission: The Black Men of Labor,” n.d.).  
The policy aims to support the actions of the organization, and thus this is clearly a 
representative policy. Ordinance 26490 was proposed by Councilor Ramsey (the Black 
representative from District C) and was approved on July 15, 2015. Six members of the 
council were present for the vote – all present voted in favor of the bill. One councilor 
(Councilor Gray) was absent and thus did not vote.  
The second representative policy is Ordinance 2640828. This bill pertains to the 
annual jazz festival. It waives certain fees for event participant, as a way for the city to 
support the event. The event is described in the bill’s title as a tribute to the city’s 
connection to South Africa. The specified link to South African culture is a clear 
indicator of racial policy. Ordinance 26408 was approved on May 8, 2015. The policy 
was proposed by Councilor Ramsey from District C. Five councilors were present for the 
vote on this policy; all voted to support its passage. Two councilors were absent for the 
vote (Councilors Cantrell and Gray) and thus did not vote.  
                                                                                                                                            
LOUISIANA, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE BLACK MEN OF LABOR EVENT ON SATURDAY, 
JUNE 13, 2015, AND SATURDAY, JULY 11, 2015 FROM 8:30 A.M. TO 1:00 P.M., TO SPECIFY THE 
DURATION AND BOUNDARIES OF SAID WAIVER, AND TO PROVIDE OTHERWISE WITH 
RESPECT THERETO.” 
28 The title of which is, “AN ORDINANCE TO TEMPORARILY WAIVE CERTAIN FEES, PERMIT 
FEES, AND REQUIREMENTS WITHIN AND AROUND LABELLE GALLERY LOCATED IN THE 
300 BLOCK OF CHARTRES STREET, NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, IN CONJUNCTION WITH 
THE NEW ORLEANS SOUTH AFRICAN CONNECTION’S “JAZZ FEST” EVENT ON THURSDAY, 
APRIL 23, 2015 FROM 3:00 P.M. TO 8:00 P.M., TO SPECIFY THE DURATION AND BOUNDARIES 
OF SAID WAIVER, AND TO PROVIDE OTHERWISE WITH RESPECT THERETO.” 
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How this fits with my theory   
There is majority descriptive representation in New Orleans. The large percent of 
African American councilors does not translate to an abundance of representative policy. 
The apparent disconnect runs contrary to previous literature, but it substantiates my 
hypotheses. Those who have not studied the majority descriptive representation period, 
but have extrapolated theories out without data (e.g. the critical mass theories that do not 
address an upper bound and thus imply that the relationship continues ad infinitum) are 
directly challenged by the lack of Black racial policy in New Orleans. Further, the 
context in which these decisions were made gives no clue as to why there is so little 
policy. It is not as if New Orleans did not care about Black representation in policy in 
2015. On the contrary, there is a robust conversation about the lasting racial legacy of 
Katrina, the impact of policy choices and how to move forward, and a racially based 
political scandal. I argue that the lack of representation in policy can be explained by just 
one thing: Black Councilors are pursuing other policy agendas, striving for differentiation 
in an oversaturated field and thus Black racial policy has fallen by the wayside.  
 
 
Figure 4.7 Illustration of New Orleans' Black Descriptive Representation 
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Figure 4.8 Black Representation in Policy, New Orleans as Compared to National 
Average 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
 My theoretical and data work were explained in detail in previous chapters. In this 
chapter, I considered how well my overarching theory mapped on to individuals cases. I 
chose four cities with crucial elements in common (ideology, size, electoral institutions) 
and tested if my theory held at the ground level. Were these cases illustrative of my 
theoretical work and of the larger trend – or were they anomalies? The thesis that 
emerged from these case studies is that the cases added to the theoretical understanding 
of the project – and did not detract from the findings. In fact, when considered in concert, 
the case studies paint a very interesting picture.  
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 This chapter considered each case study alone. I chronicled the background of 
each case, the descriptive representation and policy outcomes present in the study year, 
and then discussed how well that met with theoretical expectations. I now present these 
results to be considered together. See Figure 4.9 below. In summary, Portland, which had 
no descriptive representation exhibited relatively high levels of diversity policy. 
Minneapolis had one Asian councilor (i.e. tokenism) and passed no Asian racial policies. 
Albuquerque had 33% general descriptive representation (i.e. critical mass) and passed a 
very large percentage of diversity and equity policy. And New Orleans, with a majority 
Black council (i.e. majority descriptive representation) passed very little Black racial 
policy. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Plot of Case Studies 
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 Considered individually, the case studies add important nuance to the findings in 
Chapter 3. I find evidence of political posturing that indicates political strategies of 
Councilors. I consider how the political and racial context of the city impacts the 
motivations of the individual. And I consider the individual relationship between 
descriptive representation and representation in policy.  Considered together, however, 
the case studies paint a fascinating picture. Anecdotally, the results substantiate my 
claims about the expected outcomes at each level of descriptive representation.    
  
111 
 
 
CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
In this dissertation, I have shown how the varying levels of descriptive 
representation affect representation in policy for racial minority groups. In Chapter 2, I 
presented an overview of my theory – pulling heavily from the literature to build an 
argument in favor of a curvilinear relationship. In Chapter 3, I outlined the quantitative 
methods that I used to test my theory and subsequent results. In Chapter 4, I presented 
four case studies that illustrated the manifestation of my theoretical mechanisms, 
allowing for an exploration of the decision-making context that surrounded the politicians 
as they introduce and support representation in policy.  Finally, in this chapter, I bring the 
study to a close. I start with a discussion of the results (both qualitative and quantitative), 
and assess which align with hypotheses and which do not. I then consider the 
implications of this research both for the scholarly field and for political activists seeking 
to increase representation for racial minority groups. Finally, I discuss what further 
research should be conducted to continue this project.  
 
Discussion of the Results  
 
My overarching argument is that there are four distinct types in descriptive 
representation, and each of these types has a predictable effect on representation in 
policy. Through the quantitative testing and qualitative exploration, I find varying levels 
of support for my argument. In this section, I discuss the results of my study. In short, 
there are some elements that aligned with my expectations. There are also elements that 
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differ from my expectations in significant and important ways. Overall, there is a ripe 
opportunity for more research. 
 This section is organized as follows. I first discuss how well the quantitative 
results aligned with the hypotheses stated in Chapter 3. The thesis that emerges is that 
specific descriptive representation’s effect on racial policy outcomes was as expected. 
The effect of general descriptive representation on diversity policy, however, was a 
surprise. I then discuss the results by type of descriptive representation. This allows me to 
pair the qualitative narrative information with the ANOVA results and paint a compelling 
picture.  
 In terms of specific descriptive representation, I find support for the Hypotheses 1 
and 2. First, I find that there is considerable evidence that the relationship between 
specific descriptive representation and racial policy outcomes is not linear (supporting 
Hypothesis 1). Second, I find support that the relationship is curvilinear and that the best 
fit model occurs when descriptive representation is cubed (supporting Hypothesis 2).  
Overall, specific descriptive representation’s effect on racial policy is as expected.  
 In terms of general descriptive representation, I find mixed support for my 
argument. First, I find evidence that the relationship is not linear (Hypothesis 3) – in 
accordance with my expectations. However, there is not evidence that the relationship is 
curvilinear, either. General descriptive representation is not a significant predictor of  
diversity policy in the linear model (as expected), but it is not a significant predictor of 
diversity policy in any of the other models either. In other words, I do not find evidence 
for Hypothesis 4.  
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 There are many reasons that a researcher may not find support for a hypothesis. 
One possible explanation is that the data is not robust enough. The diversity policy data 
was set up so that there were 108 cases in the dataset. For the racial policy model, the 
data was set up differently, and the number of cases was 324. One interpretation of this 
difference is that there was not enough statistical power in the diversity model to present 
significant findings. However, when I couple the results of the regression model with 
those of the ANOVA testing (explained below), I am led to believe that this is not simply 
a matter of a relatively small-N. That is, the ANOVA testing does not perform as 
expected either; if this was simply a matter of needing more data for the regression, the 
ANOVA should align more with expectations.  
 Thus, I am left with two alternative explanations. The unexpected results can be 
explained by either a) a misspecification in the research design, or b) an incorrect theory. 
Allowing for the possibility of the latter, I argue that these results probably stem from the 
former. That is, I believe there may be a misspecification in the research design that has 
led to spurious results for the general descriptive representation models. To identify 
diversity and equity policy, I used a series of keywords informed by the literature. The 
process was exactly parallel to the one I undertook to identify racial policy. However, 
diversity and equity policy may simply be a more nuanced concept than racial policy. 
The parallel process may be inappropriate for identifying diversity policy. A different 
approach for to identifying diversity policy should be tested; more research is called for.  
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Descriptive Representation Types 
 Theoretically, there are four types of descriptive representation.  I find qualitative 
evidence of each of these types. From the ANOVA testing I find evidence of three of the 
types; tokenism is not substantiated by the qualitative results. In this section, I consider 
each type and its related evidence.  I pay particular attention to the causal mechanism at 
work for each type. 
 The mechanism at work in the no descriptive representation type is one of 
rational protectionism. Councilors in an all white council know that there is a distinct 
possibility of a challenge to their power. They are vulnerable to a descriptively 
representative candidate, who could rally the voting bloc and pull support from the white 
incumbent. To prevent this challenge to their power, the white councilors pass 
representation in policy for minority groups. If minority groups are being represented in 
terms of policy outcomes, perhaps they will not demand a descriptively representative 
councilor.  
 This underlying logic is evident in Portland, OR. Portland a liberal city with an 
all-white council and, as the case study highlighted, the council passed a remarkably high 
level of diversity and equity policy. Councilors were quoted posturing as representatives 
of minority constituents’ interests. The quotes highlight the rationality to the politicians’ 
actions.  They know that appearing to represent the interests of minority groups is the 
only way to retain their power.   
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 The results from the specific descriptive representation ANOVA test supported 
my theoretical claim about no descriptive representation period29. I found that for African 
Americans and Latinos, the amount of representation in policy was mid-level. For both 
groups, it was lower than average across all cases, but not extremely so (Black 
representation in policy average is .29%, for no descriptive representation it was .136%; 
Latino representation in policy averages .197%, for no descriptive representation, it 
averaged .113%).  
 In Minneapolis, I found an excellent case of the effect of tokenism on policy 
outcomes. The city had one Asian councilor, and though he acted in a representative way 
to his Asian constituents, posturing through Asian-specific events (like taking 20 Asian 
children on a tour of city hall), there was no representation in policy for Asians during 
2015. Councilor Yang also spoke to tokenism fairly directly, saying that his constituency 
was complaining that he was not pushing their policy agenda, but that he had to balance 
the needs of his constituency with those of the city as a whole. This internal pressure – 
being the only representative of a group, having to balance the weight of that 
representation with the status quo – is inherent to tokenism.  
 However, in the specific descriptive representation ANOVAs, I do not find much 
support for the theoretical effect of tokenism. Representation in policy for both African 
Americans and Latinos is higher in the tokenism period, as compared to the no 
descriptive representation period. Both groups experience approximately their average 
level of representation in policy. For African Americans the tokenism representation in 
                                                
29 Note that because the general descriptive representation ANOVA results were not significant, 
interpreting those results would be inappropriate.  
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policy is about .257%, as compared to .29%. For Latino the tokenism representation in 
policy is higher than average, at about .231%, as compared to .197%. Though I found 
support of tokenism in the case study, the ANOVA results did not align with 
expectations.  
 In Albuquerque, I found an excellent example of critical mass in terms of general 
descriptive representation. About one-third of the council identified as a racial minority, 
making it a clear case of critical mass. And in 2015, there was a considerable amount of 
diversity policy passed. Further, there were examples of the minority councilors working 
together to pass diversity policy – even with opposition from white councilmembers. This 
appears to clearly reflect the ethos of critical mass: there is a large, politically strong 
group of representatives that can advocate for a policy agenda without fear of backlash. 
 In the specific descriptive representation ANOVAs, I find evidence of the effect 
of critical mass. Both groups that were tested experienced very high levels of 
representation in policy in the critical mass type.  Black representation in policy during 
critical mass had an average of .586% - nearly twice its average across all cases. Latino 
representation in policy was .312% in critical mass, significantly higher than its average 
across cases (.197%).  
 In New Orleans, I found a strong example of the effect of majority descriptive 
representation in terms of Black representation. The New Orleans city council was 57% 
African American in 2015. This is clearly in the majority descriptive representation 
period. And the policy outcomes were as hypothesized. Despite very high descriptive 
representation, there was relatively low representation in policy. Further, there was 
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evidence of Black city councilors highlighting allegiances with business, economic 
development, and environmental interests.  
 In terms of Black specific descriptive representation, I find evidence of the 
hypothesized effect of majority descriptive representation in the ANOVA testing. There 
is a distinct drop in policy outcomes between the critical mass period and the majority 
descriptive representation period. Further, the amount of representation in policy is 
almost exactly the level that was achieved with no descriptive representation. This 
finding is very exciting – Black representation in policy was essentially the same when 
there were no Black councilors as when there were a majority of Black councilors. This is 
a true affirmation of my theory. 
 However, when considering Latino specific descriptive representation, there is no 
support for my theory on majority descriptive representation. Instead of dropping off in 
the majority descriptive representation period, representation in policy for Latinos 
continues to grow. In the majority descriptive representation period, representation in 
policy for Latinos is, on average, .638% -- more than three times the average across all 
cases. There is literature that substantiates a real difference between the political behavior 
of African American and Latino representatives (e.g. Trounstine & Valdini, 2008), and 
thus this finding is not a complete surprise. It does, however, call for further research. 
 The divergence from my hypotheses could also be explained by my use of 
panethnic categories. The Latino category encompasses different ethnic groups, which 
are distributed throughout the country. The results may differ from hypotheses because I 
am not teasing out the inter-ethnic differences. That is, it may be that Mexican Americans 
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have a different relationship with representation politics than Puerto Ricans in New York 
or Cuban Americans in Miami. Further research, which focuses on ethnic groups as 
opposed to larger racial categories, would further the field’s understanding.  
Implications 
 
 For those who care about the normative benefits of political representation for 
racial minority groups, the implications of my work are serious. The logical conclusion of 
my findings is that racial minorities must choose between achieving the highest possible 
descriptive representation or achieving major policy outcomes. It appears, holding 
everything else constant, that they cannot effectively pursue both. My data show that 
pursuing more presence will eventually lead a group out of critical mass and into 
majority descriptive representation, and that the group’s ability to pursue an agenda 
geared towards representation in policy is then limited. The idea that a minority group 
will achieve high descriptive representation and then pursue a reflective policy agenda 
simply is not substantiated by my study.  
But perhaps, the normative implications can be read a different way. Instead of 
seeing a foregone conclusion - that high descriptive representation must lead to low 
representation in policy - we can see an opportunity for a change. If minority groups want 
presence and to pursue a representative political agenda, then there needs to change in 
strategy to overcome the existing political conditions. Armed with this data, groups can 
pursue a more effective political and electoral strategy, one that allows for gains in 
presence without sacrificing the political importance of the voting bloc and thus negating 
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the need for representation in policy. Perhaps, with this study in hand, groups can achieve 
both ends simultaneously. 
White councilors can actively help or actively hinder the policy agenda of 
minority groups. Of those who are actively and explicitly working to further white 
supremacy through policy, maintaining a racist status quo. And there are those who are 
furthering a racist agenda simply to maintain their power; they are selfish and 
opportunistic, exploiting the racism within their community to maintain control of the 
political agenda. Throughout this study, I have focused on the actions of the minority 
group in their pursuit of representation. This perspective mirrors that of the field, both in 
terms of racial and gender representation. However, this perspective ignores the actions 
of the hegemon. That is, I focus on the ability of minority councilors to achieve 
representative policy – not on the impact of the white councilors on minority 
representative policy. Cutting edge research is beginning to incorporate the role of the 
hegemon (see Valdini’s forthcoming work on the role of men in women’s 
representation); however, most continue to ignore the group’s importance. I discuss this 
dynamic explicitly when considering the no descriptive representation and tokenism 
types of representation. Further consideration would have been outside the scope of my 
project; I have not given the role of the hegemon a thorough theoretical treatment. The 
field needs more research that explicitly investigates and discusses where and why white 
politicians promote or subvert a minority group’s political agenda. 
In terms of scholarly implications, my results challenge decades of conclusions. 
Using the most comprehensive dataset (as far as I can tell), pulling from political science 
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and public administration literatures, I have developed a new theory – and substantiated 
the bulk of my assertions with measurable, quantitative evidence. The qualitative case 
studies support my claims and provide insight into the decision-making context in which 
counselors are placed. This is to say, I believe that I have brought a formidable challenge 
to the field. In this section, I address exactly which points in the literature that I believe I 
have refuted.  
  Politicians have known for a long time what I have shown in this book. 
Politicians know that only so many candidates can run under the same banner and get 
elected. They know that differentiation between candidates is key to win. They know that 
you can only split a voting bloc so many times before it looses its electoral strength. And 
they know that once a voting bloc is split into too small of pieces, there is no reason to 
advocate for that bloc’s policies preferences. Winning a portion of a split bloc is not 
enough to win office; strategic politicians will seek electoral support elsewhere. And 
when those strategic politicians are in office, they will be beholden to the policy interests 
of others.  
If the above logic is right, we as a field of representation scholars have a lot of 
work to do. We have failed to understand the internal calculus of politicians and the way 
those calculations affect policy outcomes. This calls into question the very nature of 
representation politics. There is a real way in which the constituencies lose their power, 
lose their ability to advocate for policy change – even with an ostensibly representative 
candidate. I argue that this could explain so much of what is observed in current politics - 
electoral fatigue, voter ambivalence and frustration, even the rising power of special 
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interests. The application of this lens to new research, and to evaluating the field’s 
seminal theories, will produce rich results. 
A more practical implication of this research is the recognition of upper bounds to 
theory. Theories like critical mass implied that the positive relationship between presence 
and policy would continue ad infinitum. By not adding a bound to the theory, scholars 
have left gaping holes in the field. I call for a more careful approach. When creating new 
theory, let us all consider the upper and lower bounds and speak directly to them. Let us 
all consider the big picture, into which our theory fits.  
 I also challenge the assumption in political science that local politics are less 
important than state and regional level politics. This belief is illustrated by the vast 
number of representation studies that are at the national and state levels as opposed to the 
local level. The lack of scholarly attention paid to city level governance is a misstep. 
Local governance is where the bulk of policy is made, where constituencies are 
frequently in contact with their representatives, and where representatives are more 
responsive and accountable to their voters than any other level in US politics. It is the 
only place in the country where we can regularly see natural experiments in 
representative politics. I call for a renewed interest in local level politics, and that 
political scientists use this level of governance to build and test new theory.  
The US is diversifying. Demographics are shifting; more people of color (and 
women) are holding more legislative positions – and scholars believe that this upward 
trend will continue (Colby & Ortman, 2015). City governments in the US are the only 
governing bodies that are capturing this trend and thus they are the only bodies with 
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ample diversity to fully study representation Therefore focusing on city councils is 
doubly important. It is important not only to better understand the true nature of 
representation and race, but also to forecast the trends in policy as the demographics of 
state and regional bodies have more descriptive representation. 
 
Future Research 
 There are three distinct calls for research that emanate from my study. They are: 
reconfiguring diversity and equity policy and retesting my theoretical models; expanding 
the project to include policy that disproportionately affects racial minorities; and testing 
accepted theory at the local level. These undertakings are important to continue the 
progress in the field.  
The conception of diversity and equity policy needs to be reconfigured. I stand by 
my method, in that it was an appropriate and parallel process to that of racial policy. 
However, because the results are so unexpected, the conceptualization of the key variable 
may be wrong. There is inherent nuance to identifying policy. The methods used here 
tried to capture that nuance, while creating a process that was expandable over the 108 
cases. It may be that that method was simply insufficient. Further research, with a more 
involved policy identification process, must be conducted. I imagine that the results from 
that research can take two forms. First, with the more nuanced identifier of diversity 
policy, there is evidence of my theory. This would bolster my work and be very useful for 
future studies. Alternatively, with the nuanced policy identifier, I could find that there is 
no evidence of my theory. This would indicate that there are fundamental, crucial 
differences between racial and diversity policies. That is, there could be evidence that 
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diversity policy is unique in terms of representation in policy. Overall, diversity policy is 
relatively understudied – a finding of this magnitude would open up a vast field of 
research and exploration. 
To conduct this research project, I propose a mixed methods research project that 
begins with a qualitative review of key cities’ legislation, looking for policies that have a 
diversity and equity lens but may not use those key words. The models presented here 
could then be run on that new dataset. Results would undoubtedly open a new field of 
inquiry. 
 The second area of research is an expansion of the policies considered. Racial and 
diversity policies were two clean, distinct categories. However, policies that 
disproportionately affect racial minority groups – without naming them directly – warrant 
attention. These are the policies that oftentimes have the largest impact of racial groups. 
These are the policies that change neighborhoods, schools, access to social services, and 
ability to work. They are frequent and potent – and have effects that span generations. 
Redlining, for example, was one of the most potent, racially motivated policies of the 20th 
century. Its effects are still being felt within the Black communities, in terms of cyclical 
poverty and the lack of inter-generational wealth (Massey & Denton, 1993; Wilson, 
1998, 2009). Yet, very purposefully, the policy was created with non-racial terms. A 
research project that captures the policies that disproportionately affect racial minority 
groups, without using racial terms, across many cities would be a herculean feat. 
However, its importance cannot be overstated.  
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To conduct this research, one would need a mixed-methods approach. The 
researcher would heavily on city-level experts who could parse legislation for the 
unstated racial ramifications in their cities. Then, using thematic analysis, the researcher 
would identify terms that most often accompany these policies. The policy-identifying 
program would then have to be retrained and many iterations would have to be 
conducted. I suspect that the results would be a continuation of the logic presented here 
and further shake the field’s understanding of political representation.  
 Finally, I believe my project highlights the importance of testing accepted theory 
at different levels of governance. I call for more scholarship that explicitly tests the most 
prominent national-level theories  at the local context. As shown in this dissertation, the 
results can oftentimes be unexpected, and call attention to theoretical holes. We must 
continue to challenge the status quo and further the state of understanding.  
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Appendix A  - List of Cities 
 
 
Listed by population:  
 
New York, New York 
Los Angeles, California 
Chicago, Illinois 
Houston, Texas 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
Phoenix, Arizona 
San Antonio, Texas 
San Diego, California 
Dallas, Texas 
San Jose, California 
Austin, Texas 
Jacksonville, Florida 
San Francisco, California 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Columbus, Ohio 
Fort Worth, Texas 
Charlotte, North Carolina 
Seattle, Washington 
Denver, Colorado 
El Paso, Texas 
Detroit, Michigan 
Washington, District of Columbia 
Boston, Massachusetts 
Memphis, Tennessee 
Nashville, Tennessee 
Portland, Oregon 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 
Las Vegas, Nevada 
Baltimore, Maryland 
Louisville/Jefferson County, Kentucky 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
Albuquerque, New Mexico 
Tucson, Arizona 
Fresno, California 
Sacramento, California 
Kansas, Missouri 
Long Beach, California 
Mesa, Arizona 
Atlanta, Georgia 
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Colorado Springs, Colorado 
Virginia Beach, Virginia 
Raleigh, North Carolina 
Omaha, Nebraska 
Miami, Florida 
Oakland, California 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
Tulsa, Oklahoma 
Wichita, Kansas 
New Orleans, Louisiana 
Arlington, Texas 
Cleveland, Ohio 
Bakersfield, California 
Tampa, Florida 
Aurora, Colorado 
Urban Honolulu CDP, Hawaii 
Anaheim, California 
Santa Ana, California 
Corpus Christi, Texas 
Riverside, California 
St. Louis, Missouri 
Lexington-Fayette, Kentucky 
Stockton, California 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
St. Paul, Minnesota 
Anchorage, Alaska 
Cincinnati, Ohio 
Henderson, Nevada 
Greensboro, North Carolina 
Plano, Texas 
Newark, New Jersey 
Toledo, Ohio 
Lincoln, Nebraska 
Orlando, Florida 
Chula Vista, California 
Jersey City, New Jersey 
Chandler, Arizona 
Fort Wayne, Indiana 
Buffalo, New York 
Durham, North Carolina 
St. Petersburg, Florida 
Irvine, California 
Laredo, Texas 
Lubbock, Texas 
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Madison, Wisconsin 
Gilbert, Arizona 
Norfolk, Virginia 
Reno, Nevada 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina 
Glendale, Arizona 
Hialeah, Florida 
Garland, Texas 
Scottsdale, Arizona 
Irving, Texas 
Chesapeake, Virginia 
North Las Vegas, Nevada 
Fremont, California 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
Richmond, Virginia 
Boise, Idaho 
San Bernardino, California 
Spokane, Washington 
Birmingham, Alabama 
Modesto, California 
Des Moines, Iowa 
Rochester, New York 
Tacoma, Washington 
Fontana, California 
Oxnard, California 
Moreno Valley, California 
Fayetteville, North Carolina 
Huntington Beach, California 
Yonkers, New York 
Glendale, California 
Aurora, Illinois 
Montgomery, Alabama 
Columbus, Georgia 
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Appendix B – Indicators of Racial and Diversity policies 
 
 
 
Racial Policy  
 
Black racial policy –  
 
"BLACK" 
"AFRICA" – capturing African as well 
"COLOR" "COLOUR" – to capture NAACP legislation  
 
Latino racial policy –  
 
"LATINO” 
"LATINA” (separate from Latino because “LATIN” returned too many false positives, 
i.e. legislation containing “relating”) 
"HISPANIC” 
"MEXIC" 
"SPANISH” – to capture Spanish language programs 
 
 
Asian racial policy –  
 
"ASIA” – captures Asian as well. 
"ORIENT” 
 "CHINA" 
"CHINESE" 
“JAPAN” 
“KOREA” 
"THAI" 
“VIETNAM” 
“INDONESIA” 
"PHILLIPIN” 
 
 
Diversity policy --  
 
"DIVERS" 
"INCLUSION" 
"CULTUR" 
"AFFIRMATIVE" 
“EQUALITY" 
"EQUIT” 
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Appendix C – SPSS Code 
 
Identifying Ordinances and Proclamations from Legislative Files 
 
 
 
* Encoding: UTF-8. 
SAVE OUTFILE='/Users/stephaniehawke/Dropbox/Dissertation/data/data collection/by 
city '+  
    'data/Fresno, California/fresno.sav'  
  /COMPRESSED. 
 
execute.  
 
 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=type  
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
 
select if type = "Resolution" or type = "Ordinance" or type = "Testimonial Resolution". 
execute.  
 
SAVE OUTFILE='/Users/stephaniehawke/Dropbox/Dissertation/data/data collection/by 
city '+  
    'data/Detroit, Michigan/detroit_leg.sav'  
  /COMPRESSED. 
 
execute.  
 
 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=type  
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
 
NEW FILE.  
DATASET NAME DataSet1 WINDOW=FRONT. 
 
 
 
Identifying Ordinances and Proclamations from Agendas 
compute title = concat(" ", title). 
execute.  
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select if (char.index(title, "Committee"))=0. 
execute.   
 
 
compute type = "Ordinance". 
execute.  
 
 
frequencies variables = type 
/order = analysis.  
 
 
SAVE OUTFILE='/Users/stephaniehawke/Dropbox/Dissertation/data/data collection/by 
city '+  
    'data/Wichita, Kansas/wichita_leg.sav'  
  /COMPRESSED. 
 
select if (type = "RESOLUTION" OR type = "ORDINANCE"). 
execute.  
 
 
select if (type = "Resolution" OR type = "Ordinance"). 
execute.  
 
select if (type = "Resolution" OR type = "Ordinance" or type = "Proclamation"). 
execute.  
 
select if (type = "City Resolution" or type = "Ordinance" or type = "Appointment - With 
Ordinance" or type = "City Code Amendments" or type = "Resolution" or type = "Staff 
Briefing - With Ordinance").  
execute.  
 
 
 
select if (type = "ORDINANCES"  or type = "ORDINANCES - NUMBERING" or type 
= "ORDINANCES - TUESDAY" OR  type = "RESOLUTIONS" OR TYPE = 
"RESOLUTIONS - NUMBERING"). 
execute. 
 
 
select if (type = "Motion / Motion Response" or type = "Ordinance" or type = "Policy" or 
type = "Resolution"). 
execute.  
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frequencies variables =  res ord 
/order = analysis.  
 
 
 
SAVE OUTFILE='/Users/stephaniehawke/Dropbox/Dissertation/data/data collection/by 
city '+  
    'data/Wichita, Kansas/wichita.sav'  
  /COMPRESSED. 
 
if (char.index(title, "resolution")>0 OR char.index(title, "Resolution")>0 or 
char.index(title, "RESOLUTION")>0 or char.index(title, "RESOLVED")>0)  res=1. 
execute.  
 
if (char.index(type, "Resolution")>0 or char.index(type, "Resolutions")>0)  res=1. 
execute.  
 
if (char.index(type, "Ordinance")>0)  ord=1. 
execute.  
 
 
select if title~= " ". 
execute.  
 
 
 
* Encoding: UTF-8. 
compute title = concat(" ", title). 
execute.  
 
 
if (char.index(title, "resolution")>0 OR char.index(title, "Resolution")>0 or 
char.index(title, "RESOLUTION")>0)  res=1. 
exe.  
 
if (char.index(title, "ordinance")>0 OR char.index(title, "Ordinance")>0 or 
char.index(title, "ORDINANCE")>0) ord = 1.  
 
if (char.index(title, "proclamation")>0 OR char.index(title, "Proclamation")>0 or 
char.index(title, "PROCLAMATION")>0) proc = 1.  
 
execute.  
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frequencies variables = res ord proc auth 
/order = analysis. 
execute.  
 
 
SAVE OUTFILE='/Users/stephaniehawke/Dropbox/Dissertation/data/data collection/by 
city '+  
    'data/St. Paul, Minnesota/st paul.sav'  
  /COMPRESSED. 
 
select if (ord = 1 or res = 1 or proc = 1 or auth = 1). 
execute.  
 
 
select if (ord = 1 or res = 1). 
execute.  
 
 
SAVE OUTFILE='/Users/stephaniehawke/Dropbox/Dissertation/data/data collection/by 
city '+  
    'data/St. Paul, Minnesota/st paul_leg only.sav'  
  /COMPRESSED. 
 
 
frequencies variables = res ord  
/order = analysis. 
execute.  
 
 
select if type = "Bill" or type = "Resolution". 
execute.  
 
compute type = concat(" ", type). 
execute.  
if char.index(type, "Ordinance") >1 ord = 1. 
if char.index(type, "Resolution")>1 res = 1. 
execute.  
 
 
 
Coding Racial and Diversity Policy 
 
 
* Encoding: UTF-8. 
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*select if (type = "Ordinance" or type = "Resolution"). 
*execute.  
 
*select if (status~= "Failed" or status~="Withdrawn"). 
*execute.  
 
*select if(status = "Enacted" or status = "Enacted and Published" or status = "Sustained"). 
*execute. 
 
 
*FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=status  
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
 
compute title = upper(title). 
execute.  
 
If char.index(title, "BLACK")>0 black =1. 
if char.index(title, "AFRICA")>0 black = 1. 
if char.index(title, "COLOR")>0 black = 1. 
if char.index(title, "COLOUR")>0 black = 1.  
 
 
 
if char.index(title, "LATINO")>0 latino =1. 
if char.index(title, "LATINA")>0 latino = 1. 
if char.index(title, "HISPANIC")>0 latino = 1. 
if char.index(title, "MEXIC")>0 latino = 1. 
if char.index(title, "SPANISH")>0 latino = 1. 
 
execute.  
 
 
*if char.index(title, "NEW MEXIC")>0 new_mex = 1. 
*FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=new_mex 
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
*if (latino =1 and new_mex = 1) latino = 0.  
*execute. 
*frequencies variables = latino 
/order = analysis.* 
 
if char.index(title, "ASIA")>0 asian = 1. 
if char.index(title, "ORIENT")>0 asian = 1. 
if char.index(title, "CHINA") >0 asian = 1. 
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if char.index(title, "CHINESE")>0 asian = 1. 
if char.index(title, "JAPAN") >0 asian = 1. 
if char.index(title, "KOREA") >0 asian = 1. 
if char.index(title, "THAI")>0 asian = 1. 
if char.index(title, "VIETNAM")>0 asian =1. 
if char.index(title, "INDONESIA")>0 asian = 1. 
if char.index(title, "PHILLIPIN")>0 asian = 1. 
execute.  
 
if black ~=1 black = 0. 
if latino ~= 1 latino = 0. 
if asian~=1 asian = 0. 
execute. 
 
recode black (MISSING = 0). 
recode latino (MISSING = 0). 
recode asian (MISSING = 0). 
execute.  
 
 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=black latino asian  
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
 
**diversity policy** 
 
 
compute div = 0. 
execute.  
 
compute divers= char.index(title, "DIVERS"). 
execute.  
compute inclu = char.index(title, "INCLUSION"). 
execute.  
compute cultur = char.index(title, "CULTUR"). 
execute.  
compute affirmative = char.index(title, "AFFIRMATIVE"). 
execute.   
compute equal = char.index(title, "EQUALITY"). 
execute.  
compute equit = char.index(title, "EQUIT"). 
execute.  
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if divers>0 div = 1. 
if inclu>0 div = 1. 
if cultur>0 and (char.index(title, "AGRICULTUR")=0) div = 1. 
if affirmative>0 div = 1. 
if equal>0 div = 1. 
if equit>0 div = 1. 
execute.  
 
 
 
recode div(MISSING = 0). 
execute.  
 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=div 
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
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Appendix D – Explanation of creating the dataset  
 
The dataset included 108 cities. To create the Racial Policy Dataset, I used each 
relationship (i.e. racial group as compared to the amount of racial policy) as its own data 
point. I then ran tests of multicollinearity and independence, to ensure that this data set up 
did not violate any of the foundational assumptions of regression analysis. This set up did 
not violate those assumptions. The new dataset had 324 observations. 
 
A parallel process could not be conducted to expand the Diversity Policy Dataset. This 
means that the Diversity Policy Dataset includes 108 observations.  
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Appendix E – Regression Results 
 
 
 
Racial Policy Regressions 
 
Regression 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 strong_mayor, 
mayor_is, 
elec_district, 
city_dem, 
council_multipl
eIs, perc_isb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: percpol_is 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .248a .061 .043 .59565110 
a. Predictors: (Constant), strong_mayor, mayor_is, elec_district, 
city_dem, council_multipleIs, perc_is 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
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1 Regression 7.284 6 1.214 3.422 .003b 
Residual 111.407 314 .355   
Total 118.691 320    
a. Dependent Variable: percpol_is 
b. Predictors: (Constant), strong_mayor, mayor_is, elec_district, city_dem, 
council_multipleIs, perc_is 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .227 .072  3.149 .002 
perc_is .364 .300 .113 1.214 .226 
mayor_is .101 .129 .048 .784 .433 
council_multiple
Is 
.062 .130 .045 .480 .632 
elec_district -.129 .068 -.105 -1.903 .058 
city_dem -.141 .073 -.112 -1.936 .054 
strong_mayor .165 .069 .136 2.402 .017 
a. Dependent Variable: percpol_is 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
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1 strong_mayor, 
mayor_is, 
elec_district, 
city_dem, 
PERC_IS2, 
council_multipl
eIs, perc_isb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: percpol_is 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .248a .062 .041 .59654881 
a. Predictors: (Constant), strong_mayor, mayor_is, elec_district, 
city_dem, PERC_IS2, council_multipleIs, perc_is 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 7.304 7 1.043 2.932 .005b 
Residual 111.387 313 .356   
Total 118.691 320    
a. Dependent Variable: percpol_is 
b. Predictors: (Constant), strong_mayor, mayor_is, elec_district, city_dem, PERC_IS2, 
council_multipleIs, perc_is 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .224 .073  3.057 .002 
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perc_is .497 .637 .154 .779 .437 
PERC_IS2 -.158 .671 -.035 -.236 .814 
mayor_is .101 .129 .048 .785 .433 
council_multipl
eIs 
.045 .150 .032 .300 .764 
elec_district -.131 .068 -.107 -1.914 .056 
city_dem -.141 .073 -.113 -1.938 .054 
strong_mayor .166 .069 .136 2.407 .017 
a. Dependent Variable: percpol_is 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 strong_mayor, 
mayor_is, 
elec_district, 
city_dem, 
PERC_IS3, 
council_multipl
eIs, perc_is, 
PERC_IS2b 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: percpol_is 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .268a .072 .048 .59425127 
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a. Predictors: (Constant), strong_mayor, mayor_is, elec_district, 
city_dem, PERC_IS3, council_multipleIs, perc_is, PERC_IS2 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 8.513 8 1.064 3.013 .003b 
Residual 110.178 312 .353   
Total 118.691 320    
a. Dependent Variable: percpol_is 
b. Predictors: (Constant), strong_mayor, mayor_is, elec_district, city_dem, PERC_IS3, 
council_multipleIs, perc_is, PERC_IS2 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .206 .074  2.801 .005 
perc_is 1.774 .938 .552 1.892 .059 
PERC_IS2 -5.381 2.900 -1.185 -1.855 .064 
PERC_IS3 4.237 2.290 .808 1.851 .065 
mayor_is .122 .129 .058 .947 .344 
council_multipl
eIs 
.063 .149 .045 .421 .674 
elec_district -.147 .069 -.120 -2.142 .033 
city_dem -.136 .072 -.109 -1.880 .061 
strong_mayor .169 .069 .139 2.466 .014 
a. Dependent Variable: percpol_is 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
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Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 strong_mayor, 
PERC_IS4, 
elec_district, 
city_dem, 
mayor_is, 
council_multipl
eIs, perc_is, 
PERC_IS2, 
PERC_IS3b 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: percpol_is 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .281a .079 .052 .59287646 
a. Predictors: (Constant), strong_mayor, PERC_IS4, 
elec_district, city_dem, mayor_is, council_multipleIs, perc_is, 
PERC_IS2, PERC_IS3 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 9.374 9 1.042 2.963 .002b 
Residual 109.317 311 .352   
Total 118.691 320    
a. Dependent Variable: percpol_is 
b. Predictors: (Constant), strong_mayor, PERC_IS4, elec_district, city_dem, mayor_is, 
council_multipleIs, perc_is, PERC_IS2, PERC_IS3 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .198 .074  2.693 .007 
perc_is -.055 1.497 -.017 -.037 .971 
PERC_IS2 9.224 9.772 2.032 .944 .346 
PERC_IS3 -24.924 18.775 -4.750 -1.328 .185 
PERC_IS4 16.635 10.630 2.956 1.565 .119 
mayor_is .108 .129 .051 .833 .405 
council_multipl
eIs 
-.024 .159 -.017 -.152 .879 
elec_district -.134 .069 -.109 -1.935 .054 
city_dem -.122 .073 -.098 -1.682 .094 
strong_mayor .180 .069 .148 2.611 .009 
a. Dependent Variable: percpol_is 
 
 
 
Diversity Regressions 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
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1 strong_mayor, 
mayor_minorit
y, elec_district, 
mayor_dem, 
perc_minority, 
council_multipl
eMinorityb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: perc_divpol 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .246a .060 .003 .00826246362
0000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), strong_mayor, mayor_minority, 
elec_district, mayor_dem, perc_minority, 
council_multipleMinority 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .000 6 .000 1.061 .391b 
Residual .007 99 .000   
Total .007 105    
a. Dependent Variable: perc_divpol 
b. Predictors: (Constant), strong_mayor, mayor_minority, elec_district, mayor_dem, 
perc_minority, council_multipleMinority 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients t Sig. 
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B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .005 .002  2.433 .017 
perc_minority -.002 .004 -.056 -.478 .633 
mayor_minority -.001 .002 -.053 -.505 .615 
council_multipleMino
rity 
-.003 .002 -.204 -1.589 .115 
elec_district .000 .002 .017 .172 .863 
mayor_dem .003 .002 .160 1.433 .155 
strong_mayor .003 .002 .189 1.752 .083 
a. Dependent Variable: perc_divpol 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 strong_mayor, 
mayor_minorit
y, elec_district, 
mayor_dem, 
perc_minority2
, 
council_multipl
eMinority, 
perc_minorityb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: perc_divpol 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
165 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .270a .073 .007 .00824817488
0000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), strong_mayor, mayor_minority, 
elec_district, mayor_dem, perc_minority2, 
council_multipleMinority, perc_minority 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .001 7 .000 1.105 .366b 
Residual .007 98 .000   
Total .007 105    
a. Dependent Variable: perc_divpol 
b. Predictors: (Constant), strong_mayor, mayor_minority, elec_district, mayor_dem, 
perc_minority2, council_multipleMinority, perc_minority 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .006 .002  2.686 .008 
perc_minority -.016 .013 -.479 -1.250 .214 
perc_minority2 .015 .013 .408 1.159 .249 
mayor_minority -.001 .002 -.069 -.659 .512 
council_multipleMino
rity 
-.002 .002 -.117 -.787 .433 
elec_district .001 .002 .056 .524 .601 
mayor_dem .003 .002 .168 1.499 .137 
strong_mayor .003 .002 .176 1.626 .107 
a. Dependent Variable: perc_divpol 
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Regression 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 strong_mayor, 
mayor_minorit
y, elec_district, 
mayor_dem, 
perc_minority3
, 
council_multipl
eMinority, 
perc_minority, 
perc_minority2
b 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: perc_divpol 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .274a .075 -.001 .00828225076
0000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), strong_mayor, mayor_minority, 
elec_district, mayor_dem, perc_minority3, 
council_multipleMinority, perc_minority, perc_minority2 
 
 
ANOVAa 
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Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .001 8 .000 .983 .454b 
Residual .007 97 .000   
Total .007 105    
a. Dependent Variable: perc_divpol 
b. Predictors: (Constant), strong_mayor, mayor_minority, elec_district, mayor_dem, 
perc_minority3, council_multipleMinority, perc_minority, perc_minority2 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .007 .003  2.558 .012 
perc_minority -.024 .022 -.725 -1.071 .287 
perc_minority2 .040 .058 1.112 .681 .497 
perc_minority3 -.018 .042 -.476 -.442 .660 
mayor_minority -.001 .002 -.075 -.705 .482 
council_multipleMino
rity 
-.002 .002 -.128 -.848 .398 
elec_district .001 .002 .056 .527 .599 
mayor_dem .003 .002 .163 1.443 .152 
strong_mayor .003 .002 .175 1.607 .111 
a. Dependent Variable: perc_divpol 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
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Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 strong_mayor, 
mayor_minorit
y, elec_district, 
perc_minority4
, mayor_dem, 
council_multipl
eMinority, 
perc_minority, 
perc_minority2
, 
perc_minority3
b 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: perc_divpol 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .274a .075 -.012 .00832502735
0000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), strong_mayor, mayor_minority, 
elec_district, perc_minority4, mayor_dem, 
council_multipleMinority, perc_minority, perc_minority2, 
perc_minority3 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .001 9 .000 .866 .559b 
Residual .007 96 .000   
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Total .007 105    
a. Dependent Variable: perc_divpol 
b. Predictors: (Constant), strong_mayor, mayor_minority, elec_district, perc_minority4, 
mayor_dem, council_multipleMinority, perc_minority, perc_minority2, perc_minority3 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardiz
ed 
Coefficient
s 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .007 .003  2.504 .014 
perc_minority -.026 .037 -.794 -.700 .485 
perc_minority2 .052 .171 1.452 .303 .762 
perc_minority3 -.040 .284 -1.025 -.140 .889 
perc_minority4 .011 .151 .278 .076 .940 
mayor_minority -.001 .002 -.075 -.699 .486 
council_multipleMin
ority 
-.002 .003 -.129 -.846 .400 
elec_district .001 .002 .058 .530 .597 
mayor_dem .003 .002 .164 1.430 .156 
strong_mayor .003 .002 .175 1.601 .113 
a. Dependent Variable: perc_divpol 
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Appendix F – ANOVA results 
 
 
 
African American ANOVAs 
 
 
 
Oneway 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptives 
perc_blackpol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
No 
black 
council
ors 
3
5 
.1359557
66000000 
.52787596
8000000 
.0892273
24000000 
-
.0453759
73700000 
.31728750
5000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.9661016
95000000 
Tokeni
sm (1 
black 
council
or) 
2
4 
.2269215
06000000 
.53240891
7000000 
.1086775
15000000 
.0021049
36960000 
.45173807
4000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.0000000
00000000 
Tokeni
sm2 
(x<=.30 
and 
more 
than 1 
blk 
council
or) 
1
9 
.4771968
57000000 
.97463736
3000000 
.2235971
46000000 
.0074366
85120000 
.94695702
9000000 
.0000000
00000000 
4.1666666
67000000 
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Critical 
Mass 
(.30<x<
=.50) 
2
2 
.5188267
45000000 
1.3432117
07000000 
.2863736
98000000 
-
.0767199
62500000 
1.1143734
52000000 
.0000000
00000000 
6.2611806
80000001 
Oversa
turation 
(.50<x) 
8 .1390594
92000000 
.12495116
5000000 
.0441769
08000000 
.0345977
04000000 
.24352128
0000000 
.0000000
00000000 
.38610038
6000000 
Total 1
0
8 
.2944256
72000000 
.83169738
6000000 
.0800301
18200000 
.1357752
96000000 
.45307604
7000000 
.0000000
00000000 
6.2611806
80000001 
 
 
ANOVA 
perc_blackpol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 2.924 4 .731 1.059 .381 
Within Groups 71.090 103 .690   
Total 74.014 107    
 
 
 
Means Plots 
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Oneway 
 
 
 
Descriptives 
perc_blackpol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
No 
black 
council
ors 
3
5 
.1359557
66000000 
.52787596
8000000 
.0892273
24000000 
-
.0453759
73700000 
.3172875
05000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.9661016
95000000 
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Tokeni
sm (1 
black 
council
or) 
2
3 
.2367876
58000000 
.54212673
2000000 
.1130412
38000000 
.0023544
79420000 
.4712208
37000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.0000000
00000000 
Tokeni
sm2 
(x<=.20
) 
4 .1740441
21000000 
.08547034
6600000 
.0427351
73300000 
.0380417
26800000 
.3100465
15000000 
.1030927
84000000 
.28032619
8000000 
Critical 
Mass 
(.20<x<
=.50) 
3
8 
.5206513
73000000 
1.2169041
59000000 
.1974079
22000000 
.1206649
30000000 
.9206378
17000000 
.0000000
00000000 
6.2611806
80000001 
Oversa
turation 
(.50<x) 
8 .1390594
92000000 
.12495116
5000000 
.0441769
08000000 
.0345977
04000000 
.2435212
80000000 
.0000000
00000000 
.38610038
6000000 
Total 1
0
8 
.2944256
72000000 
.83169738
6000000 
.0800301
18200000 
.1357752
96000000 
.4530760
47000000 
.0000000
00000000 
6.2611806
80000001 
 
 
ANOVA 
perc_blackpol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 3.151 4 .788 1.145 .340 
Within Groups 70.863 103 .688   
Total 74.014 107    
 
 
 
Means Plots 
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Oneway 
 
 
 
Descriptives 
perc_blackpol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
No 
black 
council
ors 
3
5 
.1359557
66000000 
.52787596
8000000 
.0892273
24000000 
-
.0453759
73700000 
.3172875
05000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.9661016
95000000 
Tokeni
sm 
(x<=.20 
OR 
only 1 
black 
council
or) 
2
8 
.2193675
94000000 
.49257692
6000000 
.0930882
89100000 
.0283662
01300000 
.4103689
86000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.0000000
00000000 
175 
 
Critical 
Mass 
(.20<x<
=.50) 
3
7 
.5347230
32000000 
1.2305515
68000000 
.2023014
32000000 
.1244367
12000000 
.9450093
52000000 
.0000000
00000000 
6.2611806
80000001 
Oversa
turation 
(.50<x) 
8 .1390594
92000000 
.12495116
5000000 
.0441769
08000000 
.0345977
04000000 
.2435212
80000000 
.0000000
00000000 
.38610038
6000000 
Total 1
0
8 
.2944256
72000000 
.83169738
6000000 
.0800301
18200000 
.1357752
96000000 
.4530760
47000000 
.0000000
00000000 
6.2611806
80000001 
 
 
ANOVA 
perc_blackpol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 3.366 3 1.122 1.652 .182 
Within Groups 70.648 104 .679   
Total 74.014 107    
 
 
 
Means Plots 
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Oneway 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptives 
perc_blackpol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
No 
black 
council
ors 
3
5 
.1359557
66000000 
.52787596
8000000 
.0892273
24000000 
-
.0453759
73700000 
.31728750
5000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.9661016
95000000 
Tokeni
sm 
(x<=.25 
OR 
only 1 
black 
council
or) 
3
7 
.2570830
35000000 
.50350960
8000000 
.0827764
69600000 
.0892045
73700000 
.42496149
6000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.0000000
00000000 
Critical 
Mass 
(.25<x<
=.50) 
2
8 
.5862490
18000000 
1.3850479
60000000 
.2617494
61000000 
.0491834
86300000 
1.1233145
50000000 
.0000000
00000000 
6.2611806
80000001 
Oversa
turation 
(.50<x) 
8 .1390594
92000000 
.12495116
5000000 
.0441769
08000000 
.0345977
04000000 
.24352128
0000000 
.0000000
00000000 
.38610038
6000000 
Total 1
0
8 
.2944256
72000000 
.83169738
6000000 
.0800301
18200000 
.1357752
96000000 
.45307604
7000000 
.0000000
00000000 
6.2611806
80000001 
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ANOVA 
perc_blackpol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 3.508 3 1.169 1.725 .166 
Within Groups 70.506 104 .678   
Total 74.014 107    
 
 
 
Means Plots 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oneway 
 
 
Descriptives 
perc_blackpol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
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No 
black 
council
ors 
3
5 
.1359557
66000000 
.52787596
8000000 
.0892273
24000000 
-
.0453759
73700000 
.31728750
5000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.9661016
95000000 
Tokeni
sm 
(x<=.25 
AND 
more 
than 
one 
black 
council
or) 
1
3 
.3127658
59000000 
.46053281
7000000 
.1277288
22000000 
.0344686
62500000 
.59106305
5000000 
.0000000
00000000 
1.5723270
44000000 
Critical 
Mass 
(.25<x<
=.50) 
2
8 
.5862490
18000000 
1.3850479
60000000 
.2617494
61000000 
.0491834
86300000 
1.1233145
50000000 
.0000000
00000000 
6.2611806
80000001 
Oversa
turation 
(.50<x) 
8 .1390594
92000000 
.12495116
5000000 
.0441769
08000000 
.0345977
04000000 
.24352128
0000000 
.0000000
00000000 
.38610038
6000000 
Total 8
4 
.3137125
76000000 
.90082910
2000000 
.0982885
13000000 
.1182206
77000000 
.50920447
6000000 
.0000000
00000000 
6.2611806
80000001 
 
 
ANOVA 
perc_blackpol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 3.430 3 1.143 1.431 .240 
Within Groups 63.924 80 .799   
Total 67.354 83    
 
 
 
Means Plots 
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Oneway 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptives 
perc_blackpol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
No 
black 
council
ors 
3
5 
.1359557
66000000 
.52787596
8000000 
.0892273
24000000 
-
.0453759
73700000 
.3172875
05000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.9661016
95000000 
Tokeni
sm 
(x<=.25 
or 1 
black 
council
or) 
3
7 
.2570830
35000000 
.50350960
8000000 
.0827764
69600000 
.0892045
73700000 
.4249614
96000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.0000000
00000000 
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Critical 
Mass 
(.25<x<
=.60) 
3
3 
.5247739
39000000 
1.2817539
91000000 
.2231247
30000000 
.0702837
36700000 
.9792641
42000000 
.0000000
00000000 
6.2611806
80000001 
Oversa
turation 
(.60<x) 
3 .0699694
82200000 
.06263840
3200000 
.0361642
98900000 
-
.0856329
37400000 
.2255719
02000000 
.0000000
00000000 
.12082158
7000000 
Total 1
0
8 
.2944256
72000000 
.83169738
6000000 
.0800301
18200000 
.1357752
96000000 
.4530760
47000000 
.0000000
00000000 
6.2611806
80000001 
 
 
ANOVA 
perc_blackpol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 2.833 3 .944 1.380 .253 
Within Groups 71.181 104 .684   
Total 74.014 107    
 
 
 
Means Plots 
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Latino ANOVAs 
 
 
 
 
 
Oneway 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptives 
perc_latinopol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
No 
Latino 
council
ors 
5
5 
.1133144
37000000 
.3083388
93000000 
.0415764
07800000 
.0299587
58300000 
.19667011
6000000 
.0000000
00000000 
1.6304347
83000000 
Tokeni
sm1 
(only 1 
Latino 
council
or) 
2
7 
.2393243
06000000 
.4924636
67000000 
.0947746
76900000 
.0445121
67300000 
.43413644
4000000 
.0000000
00000000 
1.8867924
53000000 
Tokeni
sm2 
(x<=.30
) 
1
4 
.2319320
13000000 
.2828122
26000000 
.0755847
46700000 
.0686410
95600000 
.39522293
1000000 
.0000000
00000000 
1.0796221
32000000 
Critical 
Mass 
(.30<x<
=.50) 
7 .3121379
25000000 
.3711055
49000000 
.1402647
13000000 
-
.0310774
64200000 
.65535331
5000000 
.0000000
00000000 
.96153846
2000000 
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Oversa
turation 
(.50<x) 
5 .6383210
88000000 
.9490297
33000000 
.4244189
99000000 
-
.5400549
64000000 
1.8166971
41000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.1186440
68000000 
Total 1
0
8 
.1973858
28000000 
.4149701
17000000 
.0399305
18100000 
.1182282
33000000 
.27654342
3000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.1186440
68000000 
 
 
ANOVA 
perc_latinopol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.517 4 .379 2.311 .063 
Within Groups 16.908 103 .164   
Total 18.425 107    
 
 
 
Means Plots 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oneway 
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Descriptives 
perc_latinopol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
No 
Latino 
council
ors 
5
5 
.1133144
37000000 
.3083388
93000000 
.0415764
07800000 
.0299587
58300000 
.19667011
6000000 
.0000000
00000000 
1.6304347
83000000 
Tokeni
sm1 
(only 1 
Latino) 
2
2 
.2927320
09000000 
.5330189
81000000 
.1136400
29000000 
.0564046
32300000 
.52905938
6000000 
.0000000
00000000 
1.8867924
53000000 
Tokeni
sm2 
(x<=.20
) 
7 .1389889
00000000 
.1164205
75000000 
.0440028
41200000 
.0313178
26700000 
.24665997
4000000 
.0000000
00000000 
.33343140
1000000 
Critical 
mass 
(.20<x<
=.50) 
1
9 
.2358286
01000000 
.3356941
62000000 
.0770135
22400000 
.0740291
93900000 
.39762800
7000000 
.0000000
00000000 
1.0796221
32000000 
Oversa
turation 
(.50<x) 
5 .6383210
88000000 
.9490297
33000000 
.4244189
99000000 
-
.5400549
64000000 
1.8166971
41000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.1186440
68000000 
Total 1
0
8 
.1973858
28000000 
.4149701
17000000 
.0399305
18100000 
.1182282
33000000 
.27654342
3000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.1186440
68000000 
 
 
ANOVA 
perc_latinopol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.613 4 .403 2.470 .049 
Within Groups 16.813 103 .163   
Total 18.425 107    
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Means Plots 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oneway 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptives 
perc_latinopol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
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No 
Latino 
council
ors 
5
5 
.1133144
37000000 
.3083388
93000000 
.0415764
07800000 
.0299587
58300000 
.19667011
6000000 
.0000000
00000000 
1.6304347
83000000 
Tokeni
sm 
(x<=.20 
or only 
1 
Latino 
council
or) 
3
4 
.2186670
16000000 
.4418561
50000000 
.0757777
04600000 
.0644961
17100000 
.37283791
6000000 
.0000000
00000000 
1.8867924
53000000 
Critical 
Mass 
(.20<x<
=.50) 
1
4 
.3185065
26000000 
.3578137
89000000 
.0956297
57700000 
.1119109
95000000 
.52510205
7000000 
.0000000
00000000 
1.0796221
32000000 
Oversa
turation 
(.50<x) 
5 .6383210
88000000 
.9490297
33000000 
.4244189
99000000 
-
.5400549
64000000 
1.8166971
41000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.1186440
68000000 
Total 1
0
8 
.1973858
28000000 
.4149701
17000000 
.0399305
18100000 
.1182282
33000000 
.27654342
3000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.1186440
68000000 
 
 
ANOVA 
perc_latinopol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.582 3 .527 3.255 .025 
Within Groups 16.844 104 .162   
Total 18.425 107    
 
 
 
Means Plots 
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Oneway 
 
 
Descriptives 
perc_latinopol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
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No 
Latino 
council
ors 
5
5 
.1133144
37000000 
.3083388
93000000 
.0415764
07800000 
.0299587
58300000 
.19667011
6000000 
.0000000
00000000 
1.6304347
83000000 
Tokeni
sm 
(x<=.25 
or only 
1 
Latino 
council
or) 
3
8 
.2310112
96000000 
.4425744
76000000 
.0717950
60500000 
.0855406
85200000 
.37648190
6000000 
.0000000
00000000 
1.8867924
53000000 
Critical 
Mass 
(.25<x<
=.50) 
1
0 
.3115340
68000000 
.3175361
63000000 
.1004137
51000000 
.0843823
81100000 
.53868575
5000000 
.0000000
00000000 
.96153846
2000000 
Oversa
turation 
(.50<x) 
5 .6383210
88000000 
.9490297
33000000 
.4244189
99000000 
-
.5400549
64000000 
1.8166971
41000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.1186440
68000000 
Total 1
0
8 
.1973858
28000000 
.4149701
17000000 
.0399305
18100000 
.1182282
33000000 
.27654342
3000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.1186440
68000000 
 
 
ANOVA 
perc_latinopol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.534 3 .511 3.149 .028 
Within Groups 16.891 104 .162   
Total 18.425 107    
 
 
 
Means Plots 
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if perc_latino = 0 bin_latino5 =0. 
if council_1latino= 0 and perc_latino>0 AND (perc_latino.25 or 
perc_latino = .25) bin_latino5 = 1. 
if perc_latino>.25 and (perc_latino.5 or perc_latino = .5) bin_latino5 
= 2. 
 
if perc_latino> .5 bin_latino5 = 3. 
execute. 
 
ONEWAY perc_latinopol BY bin_latino5 
  /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES 
  /PLOT MEANS 
  /MISSING ANALYSIS. 
 
 
 
 
Oneway 
 
 
Descriptives 
perc_latinopol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean Minimum Maximum 
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Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
No 
Latino 
council
ors 
5
5 
.1133144
37000000 
.3083388
93000000 
.0415764
07800000 
.0299587
58300000 
.19667011
6000000 
.0000000
00000000 
1.6304347
83000000 
Tokeni
sm 
(x<=.25 
and 
more 
than 1 
Latino 
council
or) 
1
1 
.2106066
35000000 
.3058255
08000000 
.0922098
60000000 
.0051502
62870000 
.41606300
6000000 
.0000000
00000000 
1.0796221
32000000 
Critical 
Mass 
(.25<x<
=.50) 
1
0 
.3115340
68000000 
.3175361
63000000 
.1004137
51000000 
.0843823
81100000 
.53868575
5000000 
.0000000
00000000 
.96153846
2000000 
Oversa
turation 
(.50<x) 
5 .6383210
88000000 
.9490297
33000000 
.4244189
99000000 
-
.5400549
64000000 
1.8166971
41000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.1186440
68000000 
Total 8
1 
.1834063
35000000 
.3882101
72000000 
.0431344
63600000 
.0975660
17000000 
.26924665
3000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.1186440
68000000 
 
 
ANOVA 
perc_latinopol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.477 3 .492 3.584 .018 
Within Groups 10.579 77 .137   
Total 12.057 80    
 
 
 
Means Plots 
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Oneway 
 
 
 
 
Descriptives 
perc_latinopol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
No 
Latino 
council
ors 
5
5 
.1133144
37000000 
.3083388
93000000 
.0415764
07800000 
.0299587
58300000 
.19667011
6000000 
.0000000
00000000 
1.6304347
83000000 
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Tokeni
sm 
(x<=.25 
and 
more 
than 1 
Latino 
council
or) 
3
8 
.2310112
96000000 
.4425744
76000000 
.0717950
60500000 
.0855406
85200000 
.37648190
6000000 
.0000000
00000000 
1.8867924
53000000 
Critical 
Mass 
(.25<x<
=.60) 
1
0 
.3115340
68000000 
.3175361
63000000 
.1004137
51000000 
.0843823
81100000 
.53868575
5000000 
.0000000
00000000 
.96153846
2000000 
Oversa
turation 
(.60<x) 
5 .6383210
88000000 
.9490297
33000000 
.4244189
99000000 
-
.5400549
64000000 
1.8166971
41000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.1186440
68000000 
Total 1
0
8 
.1973858
28000000 
.4149701
17000000 
.0399305
18100000 
.1182282
33000000 
.27654342
3000000 
.0000000
00000000 
2.1186440
68000000 
 
 
ANOVA 
perc_latinopol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.534 3 .511 3.149 .028 
Within Groups 16.891 104 .162   
Total 18.425 107    
 
 
 
Means Plots 
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Diversity ANOVAs 
 
 
Oneway 
 
 
 
Descriptives 
perc_divpol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
.0
0 
1
2 
.00797234
5640000 
.01148193
6200000 
.00331454
9460000 
.00067707
1456000 
.01526761
9800000 
.00000000
0000000 
.03947368
4200000 
1.
00 
1
2 
.00228358
1840000 
.00256713
6720000 
.00074106
8539000 
.00065250
0984000 
.00391466
2700000 
.00000000
0000000 
.00800000
0000000 
2.
00 
2
3 
.00792663
3690000 
.01120406
2700000 
.00233620
8560000 
.00308163
3670000 
.01277163
3700000 
.00000000
0000000 
.05172413
7900000 
3.
00 
3
7 
.00417704
1630000 
.00655748
0630000 
.00107804
3170000 
.00199066
8740000 
.00636341
4530000 
.00000000
0000000 
.03750000
0000000 
4.
00 
2
4 
.00624195
6680000 
.00649554
4920000 
.00132589
7550000 
.00349912
8610000 
.00898478
4740000 
.00000000
0000000 
.02564102
5600000 
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T
ot
al 
1
0
8 
.00564575
1900000 
.00820952
4200000 
.00078996
1834000 
.00407974
4700000 
.00721175
9100000 
.00000000
0000000 
.05172413
7900000 
 
 
ANOVA 
perc_divpol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .000 4 .000 1.547 .194 
Within Groups .007 103 .000   
Total .007 107    
 
 
 
Means Plots 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oneway 
 
Descriptives 
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perc_divpol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
.0
0 
1
2 
.00797234
5640000 
.01148193
6200000 
.00331454
9460000 
.00067707
1456000 
.01526761
9800000 
.00000000
0000000 
.03947368
4200000 
1.
00 
7 .00302649
8910000 
.00310566
7410000 
.00117383
1950000 
.00015423
5607000 
.00589876
2210000 
.00000000
0000000 
.00800000
0000000 
2.
00 
1
3 
.00783469
9740000 
.01397379
3700000 
.00387563
3050000 
-
.00060957
9286000 
.01627897
8800000 
.00000000
0000000 
.05172413
7900000 
3.
00 
5
2 
.00463902
9010000 
.00649769
9680000 
.00090106
8822000 
.00283005
7860000 
.00644800
0150000 
.00000000
0000000 
.03750000
0000000 
4.
00 
2
4 
.00624195
6680000 
.00649554
4920000 
.00132589
7550000 
.00349912
8610000 
.00898478
4740000 
.00000000
0000000 
.02564102
5600000 
T
ot
al 
1
0
8 
.00564575
1900000 
.00820952
4200000 
.00078996
1834000 
.00407974
4700000 
.00721175
9100000 
.00000000
0000000 
.05172413
7900000 
 
 
ANOVA 
perc_divpol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .000 4 .000 .873 .483 
Within Groups .007 103 .000   
Total .007 107    
 
 
 
Means Plots 
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Oneway 
 
Descriptives 
perc_divpol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
.0
0 
1
2 
.00797234
5640000 
.01148193
6200000 
.00331454
9460000 
.00067707
1456000 
.01526761
9800000 
.00000000
0000000 
.03947368
4200000 
1.
00 
3
4 
.00463034
8320000 
.00904306
0950000 
.00155087
2160000 
.00147507
5190000 
.00778562
1450000 
.00000000
0000000 
.05172413
7900000 
2.
00 
3
8 
.00544300
6690000 
.00731909
1150000 
.00118731
3370000 
.00303728
1300000 
.00784873
2090000 
.00000000
0000000 
.03750000
0000000 
3.
00 
2
4 
.00624195
6680000 
.00649554
4920000 
.00132589
7550000 
.00349912
8610000 
.00898478
4740000 
.00000000
0000000 
.02564102
5600000 
T
ot
al 
1
0
8 
.00564575
1900000 
.00820952
4200000 
.00078996
1834000 
.00407974
4700000 
.00721175
9100000 
.00000000
0000000 
.05172413
7900000 
 
 
ANOVA 
perc_divpol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
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Between Groups .000 3 .000 .538 .658 
Within Groups .007 104 .000   
Total .007 107    
 
 
 
Means Plots 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oneway 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptives 
perc_divpol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
197 
 
.0
0 
1
2 
.00797234
5640000 
.01148193
6200000 
.00331454
9460000 
.00067707
1456000 
.01526761
9800000 
.00000000
0000000 
.03947368
4200000 
1.
00 
4
2 
.00503308
2620000 
.00860225
1520000 
.00132735
6230000 
.00235243
2340000 
.00771373
2910000 
.00000000
0000000 
.05172413
7900000 
2.
00 
3
0 
.00509588
7570000 
.00756245
1860000 
.00138070
8490000 
.00227202
1640000 
.00791975
3500000 
.00000000
0000000 
.03750000
0000000 
3.
00 
2
4 
.00624195
6680000 
.00649554
4920000 
.00132589
7550000 
.00349912
8610000 
.00898478
4740000 
.00000000
0000000 
.02564102
5600000 
T
ot
al 
1
0
8 
.00564575
1900000 
.00820952
4200000 
.00078996
1834000 
.00407974
4700000 
.00721175
9100000 
.00000000
0000000 
.05172413
7900000 
 
 
ANOVA 
perc_divpol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .000 3 .000 .479 .697 
Within Groups .007 104 .000   
Total .007 107    
 
 
 
Means Plots 
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Oneway 
 
Descriptives 
perc_divpol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
.0
0 
1
2 
.00797234
5640000 
.01148193
6200000 
.00331454
9460000 
.00067707
1456000 
.01526761
9800000 
.00000000
0000000 
.03947368
4200000 
1.
00 
2
1 
.00741946
3040000 
.01152268
1100000 
.00251445
5160000 
.00217440
1480000 
.01266452
4600000 
.00000000
0000000 
.05172413
7900000 
2.
00 
3
9 
.00464242
0290000 
.00678310
6170000 
.00108616
6270000 
.00244359
1640000 
.00684124
8950000 
.00000000
0000000 
.03750000
0000000 
3.
00 
2
4 
.00624195
6680000 
.00649554
4920000 
.00132589
7550000 
.00349912
8610000 
.00898478
4740000 
.00000000
0000000 
.02564102
5600000 
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T
ot
al 
9
6 
.00606602
3160000 
.00857554
9170000 
.00087523
8322000 
.00432845
5400000 
.00780359
0910000 
.00000000
0000000 
.05172413
7900000 
 
 
ANOVA 
perc_divpol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .000 3 .000 .727 .538 
Within Groups .007 92 .000   
Total .007 95    
 
 
 
Means Plots 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oneway 
 
Descriptives 
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perc_divpol   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
.0
0 
1
2 
.00797234
5640000 
.01148193
6200000 
.00331454
9460000 
.00067707
1456000 
.01526761
9800000 
.00000000
0000000 
.03947368
4200000 
1.
00 
4
5 
.00501659
2890000 
.00839855
3420000 
.00125198
2420000 
.00249338
8110000 
.00753979
7670000 
.00000000
0000000 
.05172413
7900000 
2.
00 
3
7 
.00534402
5200000 
.00712234
6430000 
.00117090
6540000 
.00296931
6670000 
.00771873
3730000 
.00000000
0000000 
.03750000
0000000 
3.
00 
1
4 
.00647124
6070000 
.00752313
9480000 
.00201064
3600000 
.00212751
4660000 
.01081497
7500000 
.00000000
0000000 
.02564102
5600000 
T
ot
al 
1
0
8 
.00564575
1900000 
.00820952
4200000 
.00078996
1834000 
.00407974
4700000 
.00721175
9100000 
.00000000
0000000 
.05172413
7900000 
 
 
ANOVA 
perc_divpol   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .000 3 .000 .466 .707 
Within Groups .007 104 .000   
Total .007 107    
 
 
 
Means Plots 
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